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CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT VIEWED
THROUGH THE LENS OF HARTIAN
POSITIVIST JURISPRUDENCE*
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.**
Lawyers and judges have long taken it for granted that precedent
both does and should play a frequently decisive role in
constitutional adjudication-even in the U.S. Supreme Court,
and even when the controlling precedent appears to have been
wrongly decided in the first instance. But this traditional
assumption has recently come under attack as, more generally,
precedent-based decisionmaking in constitutional law has
emerged as a source of controversy among both law professors
and political scientists. Attempting to provide a broad,
theoretical perspective on the role of precedent in constitutional
law, this Article examines American constitutional practice
through the lens provided by positivist jurisprudence in the
tradition of H.L.A. Hart. At the core of Hartian positivism lies
the notion that law and adjudication are practices constituted by
the attitudes, behaviors, and expectations of their practitioners
and, in particular, by the acceptance by judges of rules of
recognition establishing criteria of legal validity.
When the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication is
examined from a Hartian positivist perspective, helpful light
pours down on a number of perplexing and currently disputed
issues. First, contrary to the claims of second-generation
constitutional originalists, nonoriginalist and otherwise initially
erroneous precedent can possess the status of binding law
because current rules of recognition entitle some nonoriginalist
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decisions to be so treated. The original understanding matters
only insofar as current rules of recognition make it relevant.
Second, existing rules of recognition confer on the Justices of the
Supreme Court a power, to be exercised in accord with legal
standards, to determine which initially erroneous precedents to
overrule. This is a large and important power-reflective of the
vast scope of the Court's authority-that originalists resent but
that our current law countenances. It is certainly arguable that
the Justices have more power than they ought to have to reject or
follow past precedents. If so, however, it is not because the
incumbent Justices flout their constitutional obligations, but
because current rules of recognition afford them too much
power. Third, although political scientists propounding an
"attitudinalist model" have established that Supreme Court
Justices regularly vote in accordance with their ideological values
and seldom follow precedents from which they dissented, a
practice-based, positivist account of constitutional law reveals
ways in which precedent matters to Supreme Court
decisionmaking that attitudinalists have overlooked.
Although this Article adopts the core elements of Hartian
positivist jurisprudence, it also exposes and attempts to resolve
some perplexities to which Hart's conceptual apparatus gives
rise. In particular, it explicates the notion of a "rule" on which
claims that law and adjudication are rule-based necessarily
depends, and it probes the relationship between the practice of
constitutional adjudication and other, related practices of law
and politics. This Article also emphasizes that rational choice
and game theories, which characterize social phenomena in
terms of games and equilibria, yield conclusions about American
constitutional law that largely accord with those emerging from
positivist jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
The subject of precedent-based decisionmaking in constitutional
law has emerged as a stewing source of controversy and
befuddlement.1  Lawyers and judges, who are overwhelmingly
educated in the common law method, have long taken it for granted
that precedent both does and should play a frequently decisive role in
constitutional adjudication-even in the U.S. Supreme Court, and
even when the controlling precedent itself appears to have been
decided wrongly.2 But this traditional, often complacent assumption
has come under assault from a number of quarters.
1. The general literature is voluminous. Prominent contributions include Larry
Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV 1 (1989); Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 68 (1991); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50
DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and
Demonstrably Erroneous Prededents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe
and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV.
571 (1987); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that precedent controls a judicial
decision only when it results in a decision different from that which a court would
otherwise have reached); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 658 (1999) ("[M]embers of
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My aim in this Article is to provide a relatively broad, theoretical
perspective on a number of the challenges to traditional lawyers'
thinking about precedent in constitutional adjudication. I shall
address three challenges in particular. One comes from constitutional
originalists, textualists, and a few others who believe that because the
U.S. Constitution is the "supreme Law of the Land,"3 judicial reliance
on precedent to reach conclusions other than those that the
Constitution would otherwise dictate is actually unconstitutional.4
This challenge, with its appeal to first principles, holds the aura of
profundity. When one casts off the blinkers and thinks hard, how
could adherence to judicial precedents that deviate from the supreme
law possibly be anything other than treason to the Constitution?5
Among the reasons to take this challenge seriously is that, in my
experience, it resonates deeply with the instincts of many students
and of large numbers of concerned citizens who are not lawyers.
A second, closely related source of unease about precedent-
based constitutional decisionmaking arises from an awareness that
although judges and Justices sometimes profess to be bound by
precedent, in other cases they claim freedom to overrule it. How can
precedent be both binding law-sometimes prevailing over what
would otherwise be the best understanding of the written
Constitution-and yet in other cases be appropriately overruled?
the modern Court have soundly rejected the perception of error as a basis for overturning
precedent."); Schauer, supra note 1, at 575 (noting that reasoning from precedent, as
opposed to reasoning from experience, requires assigning a previous decision value
despite a current belief that that previous decision was erroneous); see also Fong Foo v.
Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1955) ("Stare decisis has no bite when it means
merely that a court adheres to a precedent it considers correct. It is significant only when
a court feels constrained to stick to a former ruling although the Court has come to regard
it as unwise or unjust.").
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. For originalist arguments to this effect, see, for example, Randy E. Barnett,
Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 24 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically
Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005). For textualist
objections to precedent-based constitutional adjudication, see, for example, Akhil Reed
Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REV. 26, 68-78 (2000) (discussing areas in which doctrine has diverged from the
Constitution's text and concluding that "the document is often more normatively
attractive").
5. One possible answer to this question would be that "clearly erroneous"
precedents should be regarded as nonbinding and subject to judicial overruling, whereas
"merely" erroneous precedents should be followed unless they were "clearly erroneous."
See Nelson, supra note 1, at 3. But modern doctrine does not rest on this distinction.
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In wrestling with questions such as this, some commentators have
pressed a distinction between ordinary precedents and so-called
superprecedents.6 Within the terms of this distinction, ordinary
precedents can be overruled under familiar standards, but
superprecedents--defined by their landmark status or repeated
reaffirmations-enjoy immunity from overruling.' So far, discussion
of superprecedent has been entangled with debates about whether the
Supreme Court could properly overrule Roe v. Wade,8  a
jurisprudential icon that the Court has reaffirmed on numerous
occasions.9 But the notion of superprecedents purports to be general.
Might it explain how initially erroneous constitutional precedents
could bind the Supreme Court in some cases but not others?
A third development in lawyers' and judges' debates about the
role of constitutional precedent has involved the injection of acidly
skeptical writing-much of it by political scientists-questioning
whether stare decisis actually matters in Supreme Court
decisionmaking. ° According to studies by political scientists who
have developed a so-called "attitudinal model," the Justices
consistently vote in accordance with their political ideologies; their
invocations of precedent are mere window dressing." Jeffrey Segal
6. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205-06
(2006); see also Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
363, 364 (2007) (tracing the origin and modern usage of the term "super-precedent");
Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in 'Superprecedent'?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, § 4, at
1 (summarizing commentators' conceptions of superprecedent).
7. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 1206 ("[S]uper precedents take on a special
status in constitutional law as landmark opinions, so encrusted and deeply embedded in
constitutional law that they have become practically immune to reconsideration and
reversal.").
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a summary of the use of the term "superprecedent" in
conjunction with Roe v. Wade, see infra note 161.
9. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) ("[Tjhe
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed."); Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade).
10. See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 287
(1999) ("[P]recedent rarely influences United States Supreme Court justices."). Similar
expressions of skepticism have sounded from within the legal academy. See, e.g., William
Wayne Justice, The New Awakening: Judicial Activism in a Conservative Age, 43 SW. L.J.
657, 666-70 (1989); Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39
MD. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1979); Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344,
1344, 1359-61 (1990).
11. For well-known statements of this "attitudinal model," see generally SPAETH &
SEGAL, supra note 10; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL
MODEL]; and JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and Howard Spaeth thus maintain that "[t]he correlation between the
ideological values of the justices and their votes is 0.76. ''12 These
authors further conclude that "precedent rarely influences" Supreme
Court Justices. 3 Other political scientists and empirical researchers
generally concur that the Justices' ideologies importantly influence
their votes, 4 even though the more mainstream view among political
scientists is that advancing an ideological agenda is only one of the
Justices' numerous motivations and that, in order to attain their goals,
they must sometimes behave strategically. 5 Complicating factors
aside, are the attitudinalists right in their stark, testable claim that the
Justices' ideologies better predict their votes than does the purported
norm of stare decisis? If so, do lawyers and judges need to overhaul
their understanding of the role of precedent?
In seeking to shed light on issues such as these, in this Article I
shall pursue the general theme-which is familiar among
jurisprudential scholars but has not, I think, penetrated mainstream
understandings of constitutional law-that precedent-based
decisionmaking in constitutional cases is part of a practice of
constitutional law and adjudication, and that issues involving
constitutional precedent in the Supreme Court can be understood
only when they are analyzed within the complex, often misunderstood
context of that broader practice. A practice, in the sense in which I
shall use the term, is an activity constituted by the normative
understandings, behaviors, and expectations of its participants.1
6
Philosophers and jurisprudential writers often describe practices as
rule-governed activities. 7 When they do so, however, they use the
term "rule" in a very broad sense to refer not only to formally stated
requirements, but also to the tacit understandings that underlie
convergent judgments about what is true or false, appropriate or
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH,
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED].
12. SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 11, at 323.
13. See SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 10, at 287.
14. See generally Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project.
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1171-79 (2004).
15. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-10
(1998).
16. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY 187-88 (2d ed. 1984); Thomas Morawetz, The Rules of Law and the Point of
Law, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 859-60 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Michael Sean Quinn, Practice-Defining Rules, 86 ETHICS 76, 76 (1975).
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inappropriate. 8 Insofar as constitutional law and adjudication are
practices, their most fundamental governing rules-including those
supplying the ultimate criteria for determining what the Constitution
means or requires-are necessarily rooted in social facts involving the
behaviors, expectations, and attitudes of their participants. The
intentions of past generations, and even the purportedly plain
meaning of the constitutional text, matter only insofar as currently
prevailing norms make them relevant.
Constitutional originalists and textualists, who dislike this state of
affairs, protest that the meaning of the Constitution, as the
fundamental law, is necessarily unchanging, and that the practice of
modern Justices, judges, and lawyers cannot legitimately alter it. As I
have said, many law students and concerned citizens assume
intuitively that the originalists must be correct in this jurisprudential
premise. But arguments of this kind miss the point that it is
impossible to say what the fundamental law is except in reference to
the practice of Justices, judges, and other contemporary officials. To
cite examples to which I shall refer often, it is doubtful, at the very
least, that the Constitution would originally have been understood to
permit Congress to establish a Social Security system1 9 or to authorize
the printing of paper money, rather than providing for coinage.2"
Nevertheless, the Social Security system and paper money are
constitutionally valid today because they are recognized as such under
what H.L.A. Hart classically described as practice-based "rules of
recognition"'" for determining constitutional validity, and they would
remain valid even if it could be established decisively that they are
incompatible with the original understanding.22
Although I shall stress the character of constitutional law and
adjudication as practices in the philosophical sense, it is also
important to my analysis that many of the central philosophical ideas
are at least loosely consistent with the insights of rational choice and
game theoretic models that characterize social phenomena as
multiplayer "games" in which the participants adjust their conduct in
response to the actual and anticipated reactions of others.23 Indeed,
18. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 81 (2001).
19. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 1, at 734.
20. See Kenneth Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 367, 389;
Monaghan, supra note 1, at 744.
21. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-99 (2d ed. 1994).
22. See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 744-45.
23. See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 100, 102-08 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds.,
1114 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86
some philosophers, including Jules Coleman and Gerald Postema,
have attempted to explain how game-theoretical concepts can be
incorporated into a basically Hartian, practice-based theory of law. 4
Within a rational choice or game theoretic framework, 2 what I have
so far described as the rules that structure constitutional law and
adjudication can be thought of as equilibria that most or all parties
find it in their interests to observe. 6 Like theories that regard
1989); MeNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1646, 1667-68, 1675-83 (1995); Peter C. Ordeshook,
Some Rules of Constitutional Design, 10 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 198, 200-01 (1993).
24. See COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 92-95; Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and
Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 182-97 (1982).
25. Game theory is one of a number of theories sometimes grouped under the
broader heading of "rational choice theory." See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE, at xi (1994) (deploying the term "rational choice theory" to include
"public choice theory, social choice theory, game theory, rational actor models, positive
political economy, and the economic approach to politics, among others").
Comprehensive explorations of rational choice and game theory include ERIC RASMUSEN,
GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (2d ed. 1994); and
RATIONAL CHOICE (Jon Elster ed., 1986). See also Stephen W. Salant & Theodore S.
Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime Time?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1839, 1846-
63 (1996) (reviewing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994))
(offering a brief primer on game theory concepts). For a prominent critique of rational
choice theory, see GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra, at 10-12.
26. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 23, at 1666-67; Peter C. Ordeshook,
Constitutional Stability, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 137, 147-48 (1992). For an extensive
application of game theory to legal analysis, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 1-3 (1994). Although game theory was "slower to diffuse into
legal reasoning than other economic contributions," Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the
Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1990) (book review), many scholars now use game
theory to model and analyze diverse legal problems. See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social
Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43-47 (1994); Linda R. Cohen &
Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and
an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 431 (1996); Maurice R. Dyson, Playing Games
with Equality: A Game Theoretic Critique of Educational Sanctions, Remedies, and
Strategic Noncompliance, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 577, 581 (2004); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A.
Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1999);
Moshe Hirsch, Game Theory, International Law, and Future Environmental Cooperation
in the Middle East, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75, 78 (1998); Avery Katz, The Strategic
Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 215, 216 (1990); William Mock, On the Centrality of Information Law: A
Rational Choice Discussion of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1069, 1070 (1999); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex
World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1227
(1997); Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63,
67-70 (1994); see also Peter H. Huang, Book Note, Strategic Behavior and the Law: A
Guide for Legal Scholars to GAME THEORY AND THE LAW and Other Game Theory Texts,
36 JURIMETRICS J. 99, 100-02 (1995) (reviewing BAIRD ET AL., supra) (listing examples of
legal scholarship that employ game theory to analyze issues).
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constitutional law and adjudication as practices in the philosophical
sense, accounts of judicial behavior based on games and equilibria can
explain why the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication
necessarily depends on current attitudes and behaviors, which must
be understood empiricAlly, and not on inferences from the
purportedly plain meaning of legal texts or the intentions of those
who wrote them. 7
For my own part, I am skeptical that the authority of law could
be explained solely as the product of purely self-interested behavior
in accordance with equilibrium solutions to coordination problems.
Equilibria are not norms, and I doubt that law could exist in the
absence of anyone having a normative commitment to obeying it.
Certainly a merely equilibrium-based theory could not account
adequately for the expressive function of legal discourse and its
characteristic claims that people have rights and are subject to
duties.28 But once solutions to coordination problems have emerged,
adherence to those solutions on the part of some, maybe many, can
be explained by the adverse consequences that a deviation would
predictably provoke. Furthermore, equilibria may generate
expectations and reliance interests, rooted in an ideal of the rule of
law, that judges and other public officials should regard themselves as
morally obliged to honor.29 The consilience between a practice-based
jurisprudential theory and modern rational choice models should
enhance the overall credibility of the analyses on which they
converge, including the conclusion that the foundations of law
necessarily inhere in currently prevailing attitudes, expectations, and
patterns of behavior.
27. Although all rational choice theories, including game theory, postulate that judges
and Justices are rational maximizers of their personal satisfaction, operating subject to
constraints, most are either catholic or agnostic about the goals that Justices might
embrace. Of specific importance for my purposes, many rational choice theories leave
open the possibility that the Justices might include the satisfaction of adherence to legal
norms in their personal welfare functions. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND
THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 10 (2006); RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 131, 133 (1995). Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew
Stephenson go a step further-they argue that judges adhere to precedent "because they
care about policy" in cases in which adherence improves the accuracy with which higher
court judges can communicate legal rules to lower court judges. Ethan Bueno de
Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial
Communication, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 755, 764 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1157, 1170 (2006) (noting law's expressive function).
29. See Postema, supra note 24, at 194-97 (discussing citizens' expectations).
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When controversies involving the role of precedent in
constitutional adjudication are examined within a practice-based
framework, striking conclusions emerge with respect to each of the
three challenges to traditional thinking that I noted at the outset.
First, insofar as the ultimate principles of constitutional law
necessarily reside in social facts, some initially erroneous precedents
are now part of the (valid) law of the United States.3" Objections to
precedent-based constitutional adjudication that rest dogmatically on
appeals to the original understanding or the purportedly plain
language of Article VI have no leg on which to stand.
Second, the recognized authority of the Supreme Court to weigh
considerations of practicality and prudence in determining whether to
overrule originally erroneous precedents reflects the very large scope
of the Justices' lawful authority. Current rules of recognition vest the
Court with powers to shape and change our constitutional law, often
based on social costs and benefits. As a practice-based perspective
also makes clear, however, norms of constitutional practice constrain
the Justices as well as empower them. In addition, the Justices'
practice of constitutional adjudication is nested among related social
practices of constitutional law and politics through which the Justices'
obligation of fidelity to the law can at least sometimes be enforced.
When the practice of constitutional adjudication in the Supreme
Court is seen to be located within a matrix of related practices, in
which some Court decisions have engendered entrenched
expectations and reliance interests, the claim that there are
superprecedents immune from judicial overruling seems basically
correct. A Court that today overruled settled precedents and held
Social Security or paper money to be unconstitutional would exceed
its lawful authority, even if the decisions initially upholding Social
Security31 and paper money32 could be shown conclusively to have
been mistaken-as many constitutional scholars believe to be the
case.33 By contrast, a decision as fiercely and enduringly contested as
Roe v. Wade has acquired no immunity from serious judicial
reconsideration, even if arguments for overruling it ought not
succeed.
Third, although lawyers, judges, and law professors need to
reckon with findings that Supreme Court Justices typically vote
30. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
31. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
32. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 547 (1871), overruling Hepburn v.
Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
33. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
1116 [Vol. 86
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consistently with their ideological values in the contested cases on
their docket, it does not follow that the Justices do not adhere to legal
norms. Nor does it follow that precedent is unimportant in
constitutional adjudication, even in the Supreme Court. Within the
practice of constitutional adjudication, precedent matters
enormously, even if it does not matter quite as much or in quite the
ways that traditional thinking has assumed.
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I explains more fully what I
mean by characterizing constitutional adjudication as a practice and
introduces some of the terminology that I shall employ in looking at
issues involving constitutional precedent. Part II addresses the claim
that judicial reliance on past, erroneous decisions to resolve
constitutional cases violates the Constitution, Article VI of which
declares the Constitution, rather than mistaken judicial
interpretations of it, to be the supreme law.34 In response to that
challenge, Part II follows the path blazed by Hart's The Concept of
Law35 in arguing that the Constitution owes its status as supreme law
to contemporary practices of acceptance and rules of recognition, not
to the intentions or understandings of the founding generation or the
bare assertions of Article VI. As a matter of social fact, Part II
argues, the Constitution that is accepted as the supreme law
sometimes permits deviations from the original understanding and
even from the superficially plain meaning of its language.
Contentions that the law requires rigidly originalist or textualist
decisionmaking reflect jurisprudential fallacies that Hart's theoretical
insights help to lay bare.
Part III considers the Supreme Court's power to overrule its own
precedents. In marking the limits on the Court's overruling authority
that the tacit norms of constitutional practice establish, Part III argues
that some precedents are de facto or de jure superprecedents. It also
concludes, however, that continuingly disputed decisions such as Roe
v. Wade do not fall within the category of cases that enjoy immunity
from reconsideration.
Part IV steps back to examine the assumption, familiar among
judges and law professors, that precedent plays the large role in
constitutional decisionmaking that judicial rhetoric suggests. It
accepts recent, important findings by political scientists establishing
that Supreme Court Justices tend to decide the constitutional cases on
their docket consistently with their political ideologies, but it argues
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.
35. HART, supra note 21.
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that these findings do not undermine the assumption of practice-
based constitutional theories, built on Hartian jurisprudential
foundations, that judges and Justices generally try to conform to
fundamental legal norms.
Finally, a brief conclusion highlights the inherent contingency of
legal and constitutional reasoning that is necessarily rooted in social
facts that are themselves vulnerable to change. Although conclusions
about the authority of precedent can surely be drawn, all rest on
potentially shifting empirical foundations.
I. METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION: A PRACTICE-BASED VIEW
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In saying that constitutional adjudication is a "practice," I use the
term in the way that philosophers sometimes do to refer to activities
that are constituted by the convergent or overlapping understandings,
intentions, and expectations of multiple participants. 6 Chess is a
practice in this sense, as is baseball. So are promising, speaking
English, and joke telling. Philosophers often say that practices have a
necessary connection with, or are constituted by, rules.37 The rules of
chess constitute the game of chess. The rules of baseball give a point
or purpose to the hitting and throwing of balls that would otherwise
be unintelligible. Sometimes, as with chess and baseball, the
constitutive rules of practices are clearly set out in propositional form.
In other practices, the pertinent rules are rules only in the sense made
famous by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein: the term "rule"
marks the existence of shared, often tacit understandings among some
relevant group concerning how to "go on" in ways that will be
acknowledged as appropriate or correct.38 What makes a remark a
joke-or not a joke? Within a community, there is likely to be
substantial convergence in judgment, and if I am asked to tell a joke,
36. I do not mean to imply that all philosophers who appeal to the concept of a
practice have used the term in precisely the same way. For influential discussions, see, for
example, MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 187-88; Morawetz, supra note 16, at 859-60;
Quinn, supra note 17, at 76-78; John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 24-
28 (1955).
37. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 17, at 76.
38. See LUDWIG WiTrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS paras. 151-53,
179-83 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953); see also COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 80-81
(invoking the Wittgensteinian notion to explicate jurisprudential issues). For explorations
of Wittgenstein's views about the nature of rule-following, see generally WiTTGENSTEIN:
To FOLLOW A RULE (Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981); and SAUL
KRIPKE, WITrGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY
EXPOSITION (1982).
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then I follow the rules of joke telling insofar as I conduct myself in
accordance with tacit norms that count as "rules" in the relevant
sense. In doing so, I must hold myself open to the possibility that I
have failed to conform to the standards that I set out to satisfy:
maybe my intended joke failed utterly, reflecting lack of true
understanding of the practice in which I meant to engage.
39
Practices differ along multiple dimensions. One involves the
extent to which practices are "closed" or "open."4 In relatively
closed practices, such as chess or baseball, the constitutive rules can
be stated more or less exhaustively, and they are more or less fixed.4
In open practices, by contrast, it will be less possible, even in
principle, to furnish a comprehensive list of the pertinent rules, which
may evolve over time. Speaking English is a paradigmatically open
practice. Although there may be widely credited authorities
concerning correct usage, their prescriptive power is limited. When
popular practice diverges too far from the norms championed by
experts, the experts must stand corrected.
Constitutional law and adjudication are relatively open practices,
at least in some aspects.42 The practice of lawmaking is partly
constituted and made intelligible by widely accepted rules, including
some that are written down in canonical form-for example, rules
establishing the offices of those who gather in Washington, D.C., and
in state capitols to enact laws, prescribing mechanisms of election,
empowering legislators in some respects, and bounding legislative
authority in others. In the aspect of constitutional law that involves
adjudication, written rules establish the offices of judges and Justices,
but those formal statements stop far short of specifying all that the
tacit rules of judging require. For the most part, judges know how to
go on, and in most actual and hypothetical cases-including the
numberless "easy" cases that never get brought because their
39. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 190 ("To enter into a practice is to accept the
authority of [its] standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them.
It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which
currently and partially define the practice.").
40. See Morawetz, supra note 16, at 860-64 (distinguishing open from closed
practices).
41. See id.
42. See generally HART, supra note 21, at 79-99 (explicating the concept of law as a
union of different kinds of rules). Hart's jurisprudential critic and rival, Ronald Dworkin,
is even more explicit than Hart in characterizing law as a "practice," see RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-53 (1986), although he denies that the practice can be
accurately described as constituted by "rules." See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying
text (discussing Dworkin's view).
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outcome would be beyond serious dispute 43-there will be no
question concerning what the rules require.
Nevertheless, the openness of the practice should not be
minimized, nor should the looseness of the term "rule," if the
undeniable phenomenon of broad convergence in judgment is to be
characterized as rule-based at all. To be persuasive, a rule-based
account must explain not only agreement, but also conspicuous and
notorious disagreement-notably among the Justices of the Supreme
Court-about how to resolve some constitutional issues. When the
Justices disagree substantively, they also frequently disagree about
how to characterize the applicable rules of adjudication or rules of
recognition. They disagree, for example, about the relative weights to
be given to evidence of the original understanding of constitutional
language and to judicial precedent, about what count as valid
distinctions of past decisions, and about the circumstances under
which precedents should be overruled. This reality cannot be blinked
away. Conceding both the openness of constitutional practice and
methodological and substantive disagreement concerning how judges
and Justices should decide some cases, a practice-based perspective in
the Hartian tradition emphasizes the breadth of the shared
assumptions and intuitive understandings that seem necessary to
account for convergence on so many judgments and that permit
reasoned disagreement even in disputed cases.
In my view, some important mysteries attend the concept of a
"practice" as it functions in the legal philosophical literature, and
further mysteries surround the idea that "rules" are necessary for the
existence of practices. In this Article, I shall be candid about my
uncertainties in deploying some of the concepts on which I shall rely.
Nevertheless, I am convinced-for reasons that I shall also explain-
that we cannot make sense of the phenomena of law and
adjudication, or about the role that precedent plays within
constitutional adjudication, without such concepts. 4
A partly overlapping portrait of constitutional law and
adjudication emerges from the conceptual framework of games and
equilibria that some economists and political scientists use to analyze
social, political, and economic phenomena.45 Within that framework,
43. See generally Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985)
(examining the phenomenon of "easy" cases).
44. Cf HART, supra note 21, at 15 ("[T]he concept of a rule ... is as perplexing as that
of law itself .... ").
45. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. Another group of "new
institutionalist" political scientists advance empirically based accounts that also would be
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what philosophers term the "rules" of relevant practices would be
described alternatively as the "equilibria" that emerge when the
parties to a "game" adhere to patterns of behavior that sufficiently
promote nearly everyone's interests so that none or almost none will
wish to bear the costs of a deviation.' From a rational choice
perspective, the Constitution is a coordinating convention that has
been sufficiently accepted to provide a focal point for resolving many
of the collective problems associated with the avoidance of anarchy
and the creation of opportunities for mutual benefit through law.47
The patterns of behavior of judges and others might similarly be
thought to reflect equilibria that have become settled because each
player anticipates that the costs of any alternative course-such as,
for example, asserting broader powers or entitlements than others
have previously tolerated-would be too great.48
wholly consonant with my practice-based approach. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999); THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999);
Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Approaches to
Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601 (2000) (reviewing SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING, supra, and THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra).
New institutionalists maintain that considerations of institutional role exert a deep
influence on public officials and that Justices try to "make the best decision possible in
light of [their] general training and sense of professional obligation." Howard Gillman,
What's Law Got To Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial
Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 486 (2001) (reviewing SPAETH & SEGAL,
supra note 10); see also Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of
Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict
Cases, 40 LAW & SOC. REV. 135, 156 (2006) (concluding that an empirical study of the
Supreme Court's cases involving issues that have divided the federal courts of appeals
"strongly support[s] the view that judges and justices engage in sincere efforts to find
solutions that are persuasive according to a commonly held set of criteria").
46. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 23, at 1666-68, 1675-83; Ordeshook, supra note
26, at 150-51; see also RASMUSEN, supra note 25, at 10-16 (describing and defining the
basic elements of a game).
47. See RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
82-140 (1999); see also Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing
Federalism, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 103, 129 (2005) (creating a model of federalism that
views constitutions as "self-enforcing equilibria" in federations).
48. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993
Term-Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-30 (1994); McNollgast,
supra note 23, at 1666-68, 1675-83; Ordeshook, supra note 23, at 206; see also Rasmusen,
supra note 26, at 81-82 ("[T]he climate of expectations and the norms of judicial behavior
must be carefully balanced to sustain responsible behavior as a self-enforcing
equilibrium.").
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II. ERRONEOUS PRECEDENT AND THE IDEA OF A WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION AS LAW
Traditional thinking about constitutional law has long reflected
two premises, the conjunction of which could easily appear
paradoxical: (1) the Constitution is the supreme law of the United
States,49 which must prevail over all other purported sources of law;
and (2) the Supreme Court should, or may even be constitutionally
required to, follow precedent in cases in which doing so would
conflict with the result that the Constitution would otherwise
prescribe. 0 The appearance of paradox emerges most clearly in
constitutional theories such as originalism that have a clear gauge of
what the Constitution would mean in the absence of precedent. In
cases of conflict, critics of judicial adherence to erroneous precedents
say, the Constitution must prevail because-as Article VI states-it is
"the supreme Law."
51
Although constitutional theories besides originalism can
generate an appearance of paradox in judicial adherence to initially
erroneous precedents, originalism furnishes the most prominent
foundation for attacks against precedent-based constitutional
adjudication at the present time. I shall therefore treat originalism as
representative of the family of critical alternatives that I wish to
confront, all of which seem to assume that the very idea of a written
constitution, entrenched against change except by supermajoritarian
processes, would make no sense unless based on the premise that
constitutional language has a fixed meaning that binds judges.
This Part begins by examining originalist challenges to
precedent-based decisionmaking. I then answer the originalist
indictment by exposing the defects of its jurisprudential foundations.
My conclusion, briefly stated, is that nonoriginalist precedent can be
the valid and binding law of the United States because it is accepted
49. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. For example, in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Supreme
Court declined to revisit the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), "[w]hether
or not [the Court] would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we
addressing the issue in the first instance." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. The Court
explained that stare decisis "carries such persuasive force that we have always required a
departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification." Id. (quoting
United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 73 (arguing that precedents should not
be overruled merely because they were wrongly decided); Lee, supra note 2, at 658 (noting
that modern Justices "have soundly rejected the perception of error as a basis for
overturning precedent").
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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as such within current practices of law and adjudication. Original
understandings and even plain textual language can fix constitutional
meaning only insofar as they are accepted as determinative within the
contemporary practices of judges and Justices and within surrounding
practices in which judicial interpretations are either accepted or
acquiesced in. This reasoning may appear circular, asserting that
Justices are legally justified in doing what they do simply because they
do it. But the circle is broken, or at least expanded upon, by an
examination of the relation between judicial and other contemporary
practices and the nature of law.
A. The Originalist Challenge to Precedent-Based Constitutional
Adjudication
First-generation originalists such as Judge Robert Bork and
Justice Antonin Scalia treated the first premise with which I began
this Part-asserting the supremacy of the written Constitution-as
primary; they grudgingly accepted the second premise-involving the
sometime authority of nonoriginalist precedent-only as a concession
to brute necessity.52 If tested against the original understanding of
constitutional language, Judge Bork and Justice Scalia recognized,
such mainstays of the legal, economic, and political order as paper
money and the Social Security system might be unconstitutional. 3 As
noted above, it is seriously arguable that the provision of Article I
authorizing Congress to "coin Money"54 was originally understood to
preclude the issuance of greenbacks and that no constitutional
provision would originally have been understood to authorize a
federal social security system." In cases such as these, Judge Bork
and Justice Scalia maintained, the costs of returning to the original
understanding might be too great, and initially erroneous precedents
must therefore stand. 6 Yet Judge Bork and Justice Scalia gave no
52. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 155-59 (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 138-40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
53. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 52, at 155-58; see also Lawson, supra note 4, at 33
(observing that "fiat currency not immediately redeemable in precious metals is
unconstitutional" as measured against the original understanding).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
55. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 52, at 155 ("Whatever might have been the proper
ruling shortly after the Civil War, if a judge today were to decide that paper money is
unconstitutional, we would think he ought to be accompanied not by a law clerk but by a
guardian."); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 103 (2007) (quoting Justice Scalia as comparing his own judicial
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clear explanation of how the preference for precedent over the
Constitution's true meaning-as they understood it-could be
constitutionally lawful. Apparently uncertain on this point, Scalia
once characterized stare decisis as an exception to his originalist
theory, not an aspect of it.57
More recently, second-generation originalist theorists have gone
where Judge Bork and Justice Scalia refused to venture. According
to Randy Barnett," Gary Lawson,59 and Michael Paulsen,6 the truly
fundamental originalist premise is that the Constitution is the
"supreme Law of the Land."' 61 From this premise, they say, it follows
that precedent cannot prevail over what the Constitution would
otherwise mean: the objective public meaning of the constitutional
text left no doubt on this score in 1787 and 1788, when the
Constitution was written and ratified, and it leaves no doubt today.62
It is a further mark of the self-contradictory character of the
current doctrine of precedent, according to second-generation
originalists, that it simultaneously maintains that precedent can bind
judges, requiring them to reject what otherwise would be the best
interpretation of the Constitution, and that precedent does not bind
judges insofar as they can overrule it.63 As explicated by the Supreme
Court, reliance on precedent is a "policy," not an inflexible
command,64  and depends on "prudential and pragmatic
considerations., 65 In the view of second-generation originalists, for
philosophy with that of Justice Clarence Thomas by observing that "I am an originalist,
but I am not a nut.").
57. See SCALIA, supra note 52, at 140.
58. See Randy E. Barnett, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, No, It's Super Precedent: A
Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (2006) [hereinafter
Barnett, Super Precedent]; Barnett, supra note 4, at 258-59.
59. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 30.
60. See Paulsen, supra note 4, at 291.
61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
62. Professor Paulsen generalizes this argument by maintaining that if other
constitutional theories are to maintain their integrity they too must take the same hard
stand against allowing precedent to play a decisive role in constitutional adjudication. See
Paulsen, supra note 4, at 289-90. He further argues that, regardless of the criteria that a
theory might uphold as properly determinative of constitutional meaning, only corruption
can result from requiring an otherwise justified theory to accommodate precedents that
the theory must mark as mistaken. Id.
63. See id. at 291.
64. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) ("[W]e always
have treated stare decisis as a 'principle of policy,' Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119
(1940), and not as an 'inexorable command,' Payne [v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828
(1991)1.").
65. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992). The Casey
Court explained:
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Justices to decide on such bases whether to adhere to the original
public understanding of constitutional language violates the most
basic requirements of the rule of law, which call for the Justices, as
much as everyone else, to be bound by the Constitution.
The argument that the doctrine of stare decisis is
unconstitutional insofar as it displaces the plain text or originally
understood meaning of the Constitution appears to cut deep. In
deploying it, originalists cast themselves as defenders of the true
Constitution who, almost uniquely, have the courage to place
principle and the rule of law above policy preferences and
expediency. Moreover, as I have pointed out already, originalism
seems to be the most intuitively plausible theory of constitutional law
to many thoughtful students and to most others who have never
examined originalism's jurisprudential foundations.
In fact, insofar as originalists suggest that either current law or
something inherent in the idea of law mandates their conclusions,
their position reflects a jurisprudential mistake. Far from being
defenders of our existing constitutional order, originalists are
advocates of radical legal change, who should have to bear a heavy
burden of normative justification. The arguments that best reveal the
fallacies of originalist thinking trace to the practice-based, "positivist"
explication of the concept of law famously advanced by H.L.A.
Hart.66 In the remainder of this Part, and indeed throughout the
balance of this Article, I shall therefore proceed by employing a
conceptual framework that is much in the Hartian tradition to analyze
the issues posed by judicial adherence to initially erroneous,
nonoriginalist constitutional precedents. But I shall not follow Hart
dogmatically. To the contrary, my analysis will reveal a number of
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily
informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations .... Thus, for
example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965);
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship
to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation, e.g.,
United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924); whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 173-74 (1989); or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification,
e.g., Burnet [v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932)] (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 854-55.
66. See generally HART, supra note 21.
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points on which his general jurisprudential framework needs to be
adjusted or supplemented to be applied to the special case of the
constitutional law of the United States.
B. Acceptance as the Foundation of Fundamental Law
The most basic tenet of Hart's analysis in The Concept of
Law67-as of positivist jurisprudence more generally-is that the
foundations of law necessarily lie in social facts that constitute a
pertinent practice or practices and, in particular, in the current
acceptance of criteria for identifying valid legal norms.' In this
Article, I shall offer some arguments supporting the proposition that
law must be rooted in social facts, but I shall not attempt to lay out an
exhaustive case. Rather, I shall assume that Hart successfully
demonstrated "the social facts thesis" to be true-as I believe that he
did.69 If so, the crucial reference point in evaluating originalist
challenges to precedent-based constitutional decisionmaking must lie
in current constitutional practice. And if current practice furnishes
the applicable norms of legality, then the authority of at least some
nonoriginalist precedents seems unassailable.
67. Id.
68. See COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 161 (asserting that "the core of legal positivism"
is "[t]he social fact thesis," which "holds that the existence of the criteria of legality in any
community is ultimately a matter of social fact").
69. The great traditional rival to positivism was the natural law tradition, classically
rendered in the claim that an unjust law is "no law at all." See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I-I, Q. 95, Art. 2, Objection 4, reprinted in GEORGE C.
CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 132, 166 (2d ed. 1995). Although I
have nothing to contribute to the natural law/positivism debate, I am persuaded by the
positivist position that the distinction between legality and morality is a useful one. More
recently, the leading rival to positivism has been what has been described as Ronald
Dworkin's "third theory" of law. See, e.g., John Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, 7
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 3-7 (1977). Dworkin's theory expressly characterizes law as a
"practice" that depends for its existence on the social facts necessary to constitute a
practice, see DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 45-53 (discussing the interpretation of social
practices), but it rejects Hartian positivism by claiming that law is inherently interpretive
and that any interpretation necessarily has a moral component, see id. at 65-68. Although
I find Dworkin's position to offer significant insights into American judicial practice,
scholars of analytical jurisprudence appear increasingly to believe that his general attack
on Hartian positivism was flawed and unpersuasive. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Beyond the
Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17,
18-19 (2003) (advancing the view, shared by "many others," that Hart has emerged as the
"clear victor" in the HartlDworkin debate). Without purporting to contribute to the
Hart/Dworkin debate, I shall simply assume for purposes of this Article that Hartian
positivism survives Dworkin's attacks.
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1. Rules of Recognition
Hart referred to the criterion by which law is authoritatively
distinguished from nonlaw as the "rule of recognition."7 To speak of
a single rule defining the criteria of legal validity in the United States
is undoubtedly misleading. This phraseology suggests that there is a
simple formula for discerning what the law is, or for ascertaining
which claims of legal right are true and which are false, when in fact
many matters of legal interpretation abound in complexity.71 Indeed,
Hart himself so recognized7" and occasionally used the plural
formulation "rules of recognition."73 For the most part, however, he
referred to the "rule of recognition" in the singular, and I shall
generally follow him in doing so.
Hart's usage might also suggest that all rules of recognition are of
a single kind. This, too, is incorrect.74 Efforts to establish claims of
legal validity or invalidity typically depend on chains of reasoning that
are seldom spelled out.75  For example, A possesses a legal right
against B because an Act of Congress as authoritatively interpreted
by a court creates the claimed right; the Act was adopted pursuant to
constitutionally specified processes (that include votes by duly elected
officials in each of two Houses of Congress); it comes within a grant
of congressional power under Article I of the Constitution; the
authoritative interpretation of the Act was rendered by a court
properly constituted under the Constitution and laws of the United
States; and so on. As this abbreviated example suggests, some criteria
of legal validity owe their own validity to, or can be derived from,
more ultimate rules. At some point, however, the chain of legal
justification necessarily comes to an end.76 In one of its usages, Hart's
"rule of recognition" refers to the ultimate, foundational,
70. HART, supra note 21, at 94-95, 100-10.
71. See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 621, 659 (1987).
72. See HART, supra note 21, at 101 ("In a modern legal system where there are a
variety of 'sources' of law, the rule of recognition is correspondingly more complex: the
criteria for identifying the law are multiple and commonly include a written constitution,
enactment by a legislature, and judicial precedents.").
73. See, e.g., id. at 92.
74. Cf Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 145, 150 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) ("There is no reason to suppose that
the ultimate source of law need be anything that looks at all like a rule, whether simple or
complex, or even a collection of rule, and it may be less distracting to think of the ultimate
source of recognition... as a practice.").
75. See HART, supra note 21, at 103-04.
76. See id. at 107-08.
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nonderivable set of criteria of legal validity that owes its status solely
to the social fact of its acceptance.77
2. The Status of the Constitution as Law
The illuminating power of Hart's idea of ultimate or
nonderivable rules of recognition comes immediately into view if we
ask why what we call the Constitution is, today, the law of the United
States. The short answer is that the Constitution owes its lawful
status to the social fact that it, or some nonderivable part of it, is
simply accepted as such within a relevant social practice or practices.78
This is a point of fundamental importance: the fact that a provision
was once intended or understood to have future-binding force cannot
make that provision law today unless a current rule of recognition
accords that intent or understanding legally controlling force.79 For
example, the Articles of Confederation and the decrees of the British
Parliament were once intended and understood to be binding law in
part of what today is the United States. But Parliamentary decrees
and the Articles of Confederation are no longer the law here because
they have ceased to be recognized as such, regardless of whether the
processes of their displacement were themselves lawful under British
77. See id.
78. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional
Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 51-53 (1994) (arguing that the "ultimate validity"
of the Constitution is "not itself a constitutional question, but a political and sociological
one"). It is undoubtedly possible to pose nice questions about whether all or only part of
the Constitution owes its lawful status to an ultimate rule of recognition grounded in
acceptance. Kent Greenawalt thus offers this formulation as a first approximation of "[a]ll
or part of the ultimate rule" of recognition in the United States: "Whatever the
Constitution contains, the present legal authority of which does not depend on enactment
by a procedure prescribed in the Constitution, is law." Greenawalt, supra note 71, at 642.
Amendments, for example, may be recognized as valid because they satisfy a rule of
recognition that can be derived from Article V. At the very least, however, some parts of
the Constitution, including Article V, are valid law solely because they are so regarded-
not because they were understood or intended to have future-binding force by the
Constitution's framers and ratifiers. See id. at 641.
It also bears noting that rules of jurisdiction and hierarchy may bind lower court
judges and some other officials to accept the Supreme Court's determinations, rather than
to apply the same rule of recognition applied by the Court. See id. at 636; Kenneth Einar
Himma, Making Sense of Constitutional Disagreement: Legal Positivism, the Bill of Rights,
and the Conventional Rule of Recognition in the United States, 4 J.L. SOc'Y 149, 162 (2003).
79. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 887 (1996) ("[N]o version of a command theory, however refined, can account
for our constitutional practices.").
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jurisprudence, the Articles of Confederation, or the constitutions and
laws of the former colonies in 1787, 1788, or 1789.80
3. Nonoriginalist Precedent as Law
Once it is recognized that the foundations of law necessarily lie in
social facts involving contemporary acceptance, the claim that judicial
precedent cannot establish valid law contrary to what otherwise
would be the best interpretation of the written Constitution appears
in a most doubtful light. Judicial recognition of precedent as
establishing the law of the United States has been a central, widely
accepted feature of our constitutional practice almost from the
beginning.81  Even critics of judicial reliance on nonoriginalist
precedent acknowledge that "[t]he idea that '[t]he judicial Power'
establishes precedents as binding law, obligatory in future cases,"
began to take root no later than the early nineteenth century.82 Since
then, the Supreme Court has invoked stare decisis with great
frequency, seldom if ever apologetically. So far as I am aware, no
80. As Bruce Ackerman has emphasized, the Constitution was ratified by conventions
of the people in the several states, not by the legally regular processes of the states'
legislatures. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1017 (1984). The ratification process thus appears not to have satisfied
preexisting legal criteria for valid enactment into law. See id. at 1017 n.6. Although Akhil
Reed Amar argues that the "right" of the people to alter the structure of government
without following prescribed legal forms was in fact recognized in every state via
declarations of rights of other background norms, Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the
Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 475-87
(1994), my own tentative view is that in at least some states the asserted "right" of the
people to act outside established legal forms was a moral rather than a legal right. Even if
Ackerman were proved wrong, however, and if it were demonstrated that the Constitution
had initially been established by legally authorized processes, past legal authorization
would not have sufficed to sustain it if-as was the case with decrees of the British
Parliament-the people once subject to it had, as a matter of social fact, ceased to accept
its claim to authority.
81. See Lee, supra note 2, at 662-81 (tracing the history of constitutional stare decisis
from the founding through the Marshall Court). Although the early history is less than
perfectly consistent, founding-era commentators generally presupposed that constitutional
precedents would be treated as authoritative, see id. at 718, and the Marshall Court's
decisions "repeatedly adverted to the binding or controlling effect of precedent," id. at
684. Justice Story's influential Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
actually maintained that the "conclusive effect of judicial adjudications ... was in the full
view of the framers of the Constitution," 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 350 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833), and
thus, apparently, could be seen as part of the original understanding of the Constitution. I
hasten to add, however, that I do not mean to endorse, much less stake my argument on,
Story's claim. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 580 n.44 (noting that Story "diverged sharply"
from leading Jeffersonians in his views on some issues of constitutional methodology due,
in part, to his ardent nationalism).
82. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1578 n.115.
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Justice up through and including those currently sitting has
persistently questioned the legitimacy of stare decisis or failed to
apply it in some cases.83
Indeed, all of the current Justices, including the self-proclaimed
originalist Justices Scalia and Thomas, have self-consciously accepted
the authority of precedents that could not themselves have been
justified under originalist principles.8 It is also pertinent that all of
the Justices, again including the originalists, apparently converge in
recognizing as currently valid a number of past decisions that many
83. There have been occasional complaints and expressions of doubt, including a
suggestion by Chief Justice Taney that the Supreme Court might dispense with stare
decisis in constitutional cases. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849)
(Taney, C.J., dissenting). But Taney's suggestion came in a solitary dissent, and he
subsequently appeared to apply a more standard position. See Lee, supra note 2, at 717-
18 & n.377. Although Justices have sometimes maintained that to treat precedent as
wholly conclusive would violate their oaths to uphold the Constitution, their protests have
addressed the weight that should attach to stare decisis, not questioned whether the
doctrine should exist at all. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 582-83. For example, Justice
Scalia has frequently questioned whether the Court appropriately follows a misguided or
nonoriginalist precedent in a particular case, but he has not suggested that these
precedents have no weight or that the Court should never follow them. See, e.g.,
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 461 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
the majority opinion that "the doctrine of stare decisis demands some 'special justification'
for a departure from longstanding precedent," but claiming "that criterion is more than
met" to justify overruling Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); see also Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558-64 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting dissatisfaction with the
"congruence and proportionality" standard for measuring the constitutionality of
legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but concluding
"principally for reasons of stare decisis" that it was appropriate to apply that standard to
legislation intended to remedy racial discrimination). Justice Thomas similarly has
advocated the overruling precedent in particular cases without doubting the general
significance of stare decisis. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. _, _, 126 S. Ct. 2479,
2502 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that "stare decisis should pose no bar to
overruling Buckley [v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)]" because the Court had not
applied Buckley "in a coherent and principled fashion").
84. For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992),
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, which Justice Thomas joined, relied on prior Court
decisions to support its holding that the Takings Clause restricts "regulatory as well as
physical deprivations" of property, despite historical evidence that the Clause was not
originally so understood. See id. at 1028 n.15. Similarly, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote an opinion in
which he asserted that the dormant Commerce Clause has no historical grounding but
concluded that stare decisis mandated the doctrine's continued application because the
Court had "decided a vast number of negative-Commerce-Clause cases, engendering
considerable reliance interests." Id. at 209-10 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices Scalia and
Thomas have also joined an opinion that relied on precedent to subject federal affirmative
action programs to strict judicial scrutiny, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995), notwithstanding the total absence of any evidence that the pertinent
constitutional provision, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, was originally
understood to bar racially discriminatory legislation.
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scholars think would be difficult if not impossible to justify on
originalist grounds." These include decisions establishing that paper
money is constitutional,86 as is Social Security;87 that the Equal
Protection Clause bars race discrimination in the public schools;88 that
Congress has broad power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
the national economy;89 that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which was ratified in 1791, restrains the federal
government from employing racial or gender-based classifications;9"
and that the Equal Protection Clause requires the distribution of
voting rights on a one-person, one-vote basis.
91
When the practices of constitutional law and adjudication are
examined carefully, it thus seems irrefutable that under the ultimate
rules of recognition now existing in the United States, the
Constitution that is accepted or validated as law is a Constitution that
is somehow compatible with results that diverge from the original
understanding of constitutional language. As I have acknowledged,
the reasoning by which I have supported the validity of nonoriginalist
precedents and precedent-based decisionmaking may appear circular:
it is lawful for Supreme Court Justices to treat precedent as decisive
of constitutional issues because the Justices long have viewed it as
permissible and sometimes obligatory for them to do so. As I shall
explain below, more remains to be said, involving other officials'
acceptance of, and the public's acquiescence in, Supreme Court
practice. But there is no way to escape the circle entirely once it is
recognized that the foundations of law, and ultimate criteria of
legality, necessarily lie in contemporary social facts.92
85. See generally Monaghan, supra note 1, at 727-39 (listing examples of prominent
doctrines that are likely inconsistent with original understanding).
86. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 457 (1871), abrogated on other
grounds by Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922).
87. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
88. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
89. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 13-14 (2005).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (gender-based
classifications); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 200 (1995) (racial
classifications).
91. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964).
92. According to the social facts view, the fact that the foundations of law lie in
acceptance and that "what officials collectively and self-consciously recognize as
constituting a valid law under a general criterion is a valid law" necessarily "rules out the
possibility of officials, considered collectively, being generally mistaken about what counts
as law." Himma, supra note 78, at 156.
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4. Reconciling Originally Erroneous Precedent with the Constitution
Insofar as nonoriginalist or initially erroneous precedent is
concerned, at least two conceptual accounts appear consistent with
the sociologically prevailing state of affairs. First, one might say that
just as some of the Constitution is law just because it is accepted as an
ultimate rule of recognition,93 nonoriginalist precedent owes its lawful
status directly to an accepted rule of recognition that accords some
precedents a lawful status on terms coequal with or even superior to
the written Constitution.94
Alternatively, one can say that accepted rules of recognition call
for the Constitution to be construed in light of nonoriginalist
precedent. 95 On this interpretation, the relationship between the
Constitution and judicial precedent is harmonious, with precedent
never standing in a relationship of hierarchical priority.96 What is of
crucial importance, however, is that the Constitution that is accepted
as law under ultimate rules of recognition is not an irreducibly
originalist Constitution.
C. Considering and Resolving Some Puzzles
There is admittedly a good deal that is perplexing about the
account that I have just offered, and I have no wish to conceal the
perplexities. Confronting a few of them will deepen understanding of
the American constitutional order and, especially, of the role of
precedent-based constitutional decisionmaking by the Supreme
Court.
1. The Idea of Rules in Contexts of Disagreement
Perhaps the largest perplexity-to which I have called attention
already-involves what exactly it means to say that all determinations
of legal validity reflect "rules." I said above that referring to rules of
recognition in the way that I have done so far, following Hart,
93. See Greenawalt, supra note 71, at 641.
94. Cf id. at 654 ("[Tlhe force of precedent ... is an aspect of our law because of
acceptance."); Steven D. Smith, Stare Decisis in a Classical and Constitutional Setting: A
Comment on the Symposium, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153, 168 (2007) ("[I]t would seem
that stare decisis is legally secured on the same basis as the Constitution itself.").
95. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1238-40 (1987) (discussing how,
empirically, precedent affects interpretation of the Constitution's text).
96. See Strauss, supra note 79, at 899 ("[I]t is no part of our [constitutional] practice
ever to 'overrule' a textual provision.").
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requires using the term rule in a loosely Wittgensteinian sense.97 In
this usage, rules are norms, and convergent behavior will often
support the hermeneutic inference that those who agree in identifying
the law are following the same rule or rules. Within a practice-based
framework such as Hart's, it poses no obstacle to this conclusion that
the rules of constitutional adjudication are nowhere authoritatively
written down or even that those attempting to conform to applicable
norms should be unable to state them. In the words of a well-known
account of rule-following that Hart embraced,98 "the test of whether a
man's actions are the application of a rule is not whether he can
formulate it but whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right
and a wrong way of doing things in connection with what he does."99
What matters is that those participating in the practice should regard
their behavior as governed by norms and that they should be open to
persuasion that they have behaved mistakenly."°
Matters grow more complex and puzzling, however, when-as
sometimes occurs in constitutional law-the rules of recognition must
be inferred from current practice" and disagreement exists among
those within the practice about what counts as "going on" correctly.
As Ronald Dworkin rightly emphasizes, the practice of constitutional
interpretation is deeply argumentative,1 2 with Supreme Court
Justices disagreeing recurrently about the criteria by which they
should distinguish valid constitutional claims from invalid ones. If the
Justices themselves are divided about the applicable rules of
recognition, Dworkin believes, then it is either false or misleading to
97. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
98. See HART, supra note 21, at 289.
99. PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO
PHILOSOPHY 58 (1958).
100. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
101. See Greenawalt, supra note 71, at 624 ("The reconstruction of the practices of
officials tells us what the standards are for law in a society."); Himma, supra note 78, at
158 ("[A] correct description of the validity criteria in a legal system S must express those
properties that, as a matter of observable empirical fact, officials collectively recognize as
giving rise to legally valid norms they are obligated to enforce."). Probably the best
known reconstruction effort is that of Philip Bobbitt, who has identified a variety of
"modalities" of constitutional argument-one of which is a precedential argument-that
are capable of establishing a constitutional claim as legally valid. See PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-119 (1982). For
commentary on Professor Bobbitt's modality-based approach, see, for example, Michael
C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1788-94 (1997); and Dennis Patterson, Conscience
and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 293-306 (1993) (reviewing PHILIP BOBBIT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991)).
102. See DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 3-4, 13 (noting that legal practice generally is
inherently argumentative).
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maintain that their conduct is rule-governed at all."°3 Confronting the
same phenomena, Matthew Adler concludes that there are multiple
groups applying diverse rules or criteria of recognition, with at most a
partial overlap among them.1°4
Although this challenge is clearly formidable, positivist legal
theory in the Hartian tradition seems to me to be basically correct in
inviting us to think of even the sharpest constitutional disputes as
bounded and shaped by widely shared, even if tacit, normative
understandings. If disagreement is temporarily put to one side, the
phenomenon of "easy cases,"10 5 to which I have called attention
already, strongly supports this conclusion10 6: nearly everyone agrees
that there is a clear, correct outcome to some actual or imaginable
disputes. Relatedly, there tends to be broad consensus among
lawyers and judges about which arguments are legally colorable and
which are not-about which can be asserted in good faith and with a
straight face, even if they are not likely to win, and which have no
plausible resonance with the current understandings of most
practitioners.
Against the background of broad agreement, it should occasion
no surprise that disagreements, even fundamental ones, should also
occur. The most basic element of rule-following is simply
"understanding" 7 : one does not need to "interpret" a rule when one
knows immediately and unreflectively how to go on. Yet
constitutional law has always, understandably, been thought to
103. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 39-45 (1977) (arguing that
Hart's account of the rule of recognition as the "master rule" of a legal system is
untenable); see also Andrei Marmour, Legal Conventionalism, 4 LEGAL THEORY 509, 513
(1998) (quoting an unpublished manuscript in which Dworkin asserts that" 'Hart's picture
of law, as fixed by a conventional rule of recognition, cannot be sustained' ").
104. See Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 719, 730-31 (2006); cf STANLEY
FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 322 (1980) (asserting that "meanings are the property neither of fixed and
stable texts nor of free and independent readers but of interpretive communities that are
responsible both for the shape of a reader's activities and for the texts those activities
produce" and explaining interpretive disagreement as resulting from the existence of
multiple interpretive communities).
105. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
106. Strikingly, even the proponents of the attitudinal model of Supreme Court
decisionmaking, who insist that the Justices regularly vote in accordance with their
political convictions, do not deny that "[miany meritless cases undoubtedly exist
[especially in the lower courts] that no self-respecting judge would decide solely on the
basis of ... policy preferences." SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED,
supra note 11, at 93. Such cases, they acknowledge, are governed by rules. Id. at 92-93.
107. See, e.g., Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the
Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1993).
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require "interpretation "-a reflective activity most at home in
contexts that provoke uncertainty." s Indeed, the high stakes involved
in many constitutional cases seem especially likely to trigger
reflection and analysis that may, in turn, actually exacerbate doubt.
Then, as analysis deepens, it should not be surprising that second-
order uncertainties and debates would arise about the processes that
judges and Justices should follow in resolving constitutional
questions. Even in disputed cases, however, accepted rules (in the
Wittgensteinian sense) typically structure and confine legal argument,
even if they do not decisively determine unique resolutions on which
all, or nearly all, competent practitioners will converge. Under these
circumstances, one might understand the glass as being either half full
or half empty, but one could surely not say that there is no glass at all
or that there is nothing in the glass that constitutes the rule or rules of
recognition. 9 Although the Justices of the Supreme Court have
enormous authority not only to base their decisions on controversial
views concerning the "best" understanding of pertinent authorities,11
but also to "bargain" with one another about what the governing
constitutional law ought to be in the future,"' some linguistically
imaginable interpretations are simply beyond the pale, and some
conclusions are demonstrably correct.
Although I have arrived at this admittedly vague conclusion
through jurisprudential analysis, it is significant that the
jurisprudential scholarship on which I have drawn is largely
consonant with the findings of a broad array of political scientists. At
the forefront stand the game theorists who explain how conventions
108. See id.
109. Stanley Fish argues that when the term "rule" is used in this loose a sense, it is
either redundant or misleading, since competent practitioners will know how to "go on" in
interpretive practice without reference to the "rules" that they are ostensibly supposed to
follow. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1328-29 (1984). In my
view, however, in law-possibly unlike other practices that call for interpretation-there is
a dialectical relationship between shared tacit understandings and attempts to articulate
those understandings in propositional form. As a result, appeals to "rules," and arguments
about them, inform judgments and can sometimes provoke reappraisals of what counts as
"going on" correctly. See generally Owen Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177
(1985).
110. See Himma, supra note 78, at 178 (asserting that the Justices' criticisms of one
another for their choice of interpretive methodologies "suggest[] ... that the Justices are
practicing a recognition norm that requires the Court to ground its validity decisions in the
best interpretation of the Constitution").
111. See COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 100 (characterizing the rule of recognition in the
United States as a conventional "framework for bargaining" that may frequently "involve
moral or political arguments" about "how to go on" in a way that all might come to accept
as a basis for stable future cooperation).
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and equilibria can emerge from and then shape the strategic
interactions of multiple parties. Indeed, as I have noted, some
jurisprudential theorists in the Hartian tradition have incorporated
game theoretic concepts into their accounts of the nature of legal
rules, including the rule of recognition.'12 In a slightly more surprising
convergence, my conclusion that legal rules or equilibria may often
bound disagreement even when they do not uniquely dictate
outcomes is not inconsistent with, and indeed might help to explain,
the findings of attitudinalist political scientists who predict Supreme
Court Justices' voting behavior based on their political ideologies.113
If the Justices are authorized to make judgments about what would be
best from a moral or policy-based perspective within the bounds
established by shared understandings of the constitutionally
colorable, then practice-based theorists in the Hartian tradition can
embrace, rather than reject, the attitudinalists' central conclusions.
One more point of comparison may also bear noting. Whereas
my conclusion that applicable constitutional rules, including rules of
recognition, give the Justices a significant authority to shape the law
accords with the analyses of many political scientists, it will disturb
other observers, including constitutional orginalists, who hold an ideal
of the rule of law that calls for more legal determinacy. I shall discuss
this concern more fully below.
2. Identifying a Practice and Its Practitioners: Whose Acceptance
Matters?
I have said that among the challenges confronting practice-based
theories of law is to sketch the lines that distinguish the relevant
practice and its practitioners from other, possibly related practices
and those who engage in them."4 In explicating the idea of a rule or
rules of recognition, Hart thought the relevant practices were those of
law-applying officials, especially judges."5 Any application of Hartian
112. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Ruger et al., supra note 14, at 1171-79. This conclusion is consistent with
the attitudinal model even if there is no necessary agreement on how the Justices actually
reason to their conclusions-a point of potential dispute that I shall take up below. See
infra Part IV.
114. Matthew Adler offers one of the best and most challenging explorations of this
question. See generally Adler, supra note 104. Professor Adler concludes that rather than
there being one rule of recognition definitively fixed by one identifiable group (such as by
judges, for example), there are multiple "recognition groups" accepting multiple, largely
but not perfectly, overlapping rules of recognition. See id. at 730-31.
115. See HART, supra note 21, at 256 ("[T]he rule of recognition ... is in effect a form
of judicial customary rule existing only if it is accepted and practised in the law-identifying
and law-applying operations of the courts."); see also id. at 116 ("[R]ules of recognition
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positivist theory to the legal system of the United States must
therefore emphasize the central role of Supreme Court Justices. But
that emphasis should not be exclusive-a point that can be brought
out by asking whether it follows from a practice-based account that
the constitutional law of the United States is whatever the Justices say
that it is. As I have suggested, in the view of some, perhaps many, the
prospect that the Constitution might mean no more than what the
Justices say it means is a nightmare sufficiently frightening to inspire a
flight to originalism, which promises to bind the Justices to
unchanging law.
Hart himself rebuffed the suggestion that the Constitution means
whatever the Justices say that it means in terms that still seem largely
correct:
At any given moment judges, even those of a supreme court,
are parts of a system the rules of which are determinate enough
at the centre to supply standards of correct judicial decision.
These are regarded by the courts as something which they are
not free to disregard in the exercise of the authority to make
those decisions which cannot be challenged within the
system.... The adherence of the judge is required to maintain
the standards, but the judge does not make them."6
Despite my basic agreement, I would differ from Hart with
respect to a point of emphasis, and I would also introduce a
supplemental explanation. With respect to emphasis, it should be
made explicit that although Supreme Court Justices are bound by
legal rules, the pertinent rules either have a broader area of open
texture than Hart's formulation might suggest or vest the Justices
with considerable responsibility for making important practical
judgments." 7 It matters enormously who sits on the Supreme Court,
where legal rules bind, but shared understandings often fail to
determine ultimate conclusions.
specifying the criteria of legal validity and [the legal system's] rules of change ... must be
effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials.").
By contrast, Hart said, "[t]he ordinary citizen manifests his acceptance largely by
acquiescence." Id. at 61.
116. Id. at 145-46.
117. For current purposes, I put to one side the important, much mooted question of
whether the rule of recognition observed by officials is better characterized as a "social
rule," see id. at 55-61, 254-59; a "convention" or "Lewis-convention," see, e.g., Adler,
supra note 104, at 730-31 (explicating but not endorsing this view); a "shared cooperative
activity," see, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL THEORY
387, 394-401 (2002); a "constitutive rule," see Marmour, supra note 103, at 521-27; or in
some other terms.
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With respect to supplemental explanation, I would maintain that
even if the Justices might otherwise be disposed to deviate from
ultimate rules of recognition, they would be constrained to some
extent by others' practices of recognition in ways that rational choice
and game theoretic accounts that employ the notion of multiple
equilibria help to illuminate. n8 Although I shall not attempt to
identify the diversity of actors who have roles in constituting and
supporting our constitutional regime, the Justices' practices are
nested among, and are almost necessarily sensitive to, a variety of
legal and political practices involving nonjudicial officials and the
concerned public.119
The claim that the Justices' practices are sensitive to the practices
of nonjudicial officials is most straightforwardly empirical and
predictive, and is supported by strategic speculations. Supreme Court
decisions can be efficacious only insofar as they are accepted as
legally legitimate by other public officials without whose cooperation
judicial decrees would go unenforced. Justices who care about the
implementation of their rulings thus have a reason to regard other
officials' potentially defiant reactions as a constraint on their
decisionmaking 2 ° Also pertinent to understanding the role of the
Supreme Court in applying and sometimes adapting ultimate rules of
recognition is the Court's need to maintain the support, acceptance,
or at least the acquiescence of a broader public within a structure of
government that creates multiple levers of influence on the Court's
size, its composition, and its jurisdiction.121 Justices of the Supreme
118. Although Hart emphasized the importance of the practice of judges in observing
the rule of recognition, he did not wholly ignore the patterns of acceptance or
acquiescence by other officials and, ultimately, by ordinary citizens necessary to "the
complex phenomenon which we call the existence of a legal system." HART, supra note
21, at 61.
119. See Himma, supra note 78, at 154 ("Since the legal authority of the courts is
constrained by the acceptance of other officials, the existence and content of the rule of
recognition depend on the joint practices of both judges and other officials."); cf
McNollgast, supra note 23, at 1666-68, 1675-83 (noting how attitudes and likely responses
of other institutional actors, including Congress and the lower courts, may influence
Supreme Court decisionmaking).
120. See Himma, supra note 78, at 154; see also Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court
Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1341-42 (2006) (discussing effects of
"implementation concerns" on Supreme Court decisionmaking); Barry Friedman, The
Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 295-308 (2005) (discussing the effect of
need to secure compliance from lower court judges on Supreme Court decisionmaking).
121. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1018, 1021 (1996). In suggesting that the Supreme Court's practices of recognition are
constrained by and in some respects take account of public opinion, I need to be careful
not to overstate my claim. Pursuant to applicable rules, the Supreme Court can-and
sometimes may be legally required to-pronounce judgments that many of the public may
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Court are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate
with the acceptability of their general views very much in mind.122
Congress also has the power to adjust the size of the Courtl--a
power that it has used in the past in order to achieve policy goals124 -
and possesses at least some authority to control the Court's
jurisdiction."z Under these circumstances, Supreme Court Justices
who want to maintain the long-term efficacy of their own rulings must
recognize dominant public sentiment-typically as manifest through
elections and the political branches-as a constraint on this authority
to shape constitutional law, at least with respect to matters of high
public salience.126
think mistaken, even outrageous. Insofar as individual decisions are concerned, the Court
is a countermajoritarian institution, charged to enforce the law even when enforcing the
law is not popular. As recent political science literature has confirmed, the Court enjoys a
reservoir of "diffuse support" that is little threatened by particular decisions. See Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1828-33 (2005).
Nevertheless, the Court must not get too far out of line with dominant currents of public
opinion if its rulings are to prove efficacious.
122. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 93-105 (1985);
Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2182-91 (2006); see
also Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 769, 801-02 (2006) ("[I]n the last fifty
to eighty years the Court has come to be seen as a more important player than ever before
in effectuating political and social change. As a result, the political views of individual
Justices have become correspondingly more important." (citation omitted)); Daryl J.
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2368 (2006) ("[I]t is precisely under strongly unified governments that the political
branches are most able to constrain the Court and over time to exercise further control by
appointing a number of Justices.").
123. Over the course of American history the number of seats on the Supreme Court
has been as low as six and as high as ten. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J.
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 35 & n.43 (5th ed. 2003).
124. See, e.g., id. (noting that Congress in 1863 reduced the size of the Supreme Court
to just seven Justices "to keep President Johnson from filling vacancies").
125. See id. at 319-57 (discussing jurisdiction-stripping efforts and the issues that they
present).
126. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 15, at 157-59. Probably the best measure
of the Court's sensitivity to the public acceptability of its decisions lies in its historic
pattern of decisionmaking. As Robert Dahl documented more than fifty years ago, the
Supreme Court has seldom been seriously out of touch with aroused political majorities
for any sustained period. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957); see also ROBERT
A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 190 (1989) ("[T]he views of a majority of the
justices of the Supreme Court are never out of line for very long with the views prevailing
among the lawmaking majorities of the country."); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (1960) ("[lt is hard to find a single historical instance
when the Court has stood firm for very long against a really clear wave of public
demand."); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text,
Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 687 (2006) ("We live in a nation where our
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In describing the Supreme Court as constrained, I have thus far
spoken in an empirical or strategic vein, without explaining how the
constraints that I have identified relate to legal norms. The problem
here seems to me to be a deep one-in ways that the Wittgensteinian
notion of a rule helps to bring out though not ultimately to resolve.
Looking at the Supreme Court's long-term pattern of decisions, I
would surmise that the Justices have internalized the constraint that
the Court must conduct itself in ways that the public will accept as
lawful and practically tolerable as an element of the rules of
recognition applicable to constitutional cases: the Court's
interpretations of the Constitution must be likely to be accepted and
enforced by at least a critical mass of the officials normally counted
on to implement judicial decisions, and they should not trigger a
strong and enduring sense of mass outrage by political majorities that
the Court has overstepped its constitutional powers.
The Court, I must emphasize, has never stated explicitly that
such a rule exists. Moreover, the one opinion of which I know in
which the Court suggested that public attitudes should influence it-
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,'27 in
which it said that it must consider public sensibilities in determining
whether to overrule its most iconic precedentsl 2 -- triggered protests
not only from commentators, but also from the dissenting Justices.
129
Nevertheless, it is easy to point to cases, tracing as far back as
Marbury v. Madison,"' in which the Court has adhered to a rule (in
the Wittgensteinian sense) of prudential avoidance of decisions likely
to provoke executive branch defiance that would be backed by public
Supreme Court follows the presidential and senatorial election returns and frequently
overrules major precedents, invoking the constitutional text as its reason for doing so.").
But see SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 11, at 424-28
(arguing that Supreme Court decisions generally correspond with public opinion not
because the Justices take public opinion into account, but because public opinion
influences who is nominated and confirmed to sit on the Court).
127. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
128. Id. at 867-69.
129. Id. at 996-1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("I cannot agree with, indeed I am appalled by, the Court's suggestion that the
decision whether to stand by an erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly
influenced-against overruling, no less-by the substantial and continuing public
opposition the decision has generated."); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst
Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1031-38 (2003) ("The
Court in Casey ... says the most monstrous thing imaginable: that the Court should
adhere to even clearly wrong decisions, and especially to its most egregiously wrong
decisions, so that it can avoid damage to its own legitimacy and maintain its power.").
130. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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opinion.' Although Marbury spoke assertively of judicial power,
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in fact reached a result crafted to
avoid a showdown that the Court could not have won. 32 Since
Marbury, the Court has exhibited a recurrent strand of prudential
decisionmaking in which it has seldom entered rulings that it could
not expect federal officials, centrally including the President, to obey.
Under these circumstances, I believe that a tacit understanding exists
among the Justices and the legal profession that just as the
Constitution should not be so interpreted as to make it a "suicide
pact," '133 neither should the Justices adopt positions that put the
Court's long-term authority seriously at risk.
Positing an internal connection between the rules of recognition
applied by the Supreme Court and public practices of recognition of
judicial decisions as legitimate or illegitimate helps to explain why-
as I have emphasized-it is virtually unimaginable that the Justices
could ever renounce long-settled precedents around which public
support and entrenched expectations have developed. A Supreme
Court that held that paper money and Social Security were
unconstitutional, that Brown v. Board of Education"' was wrongly
decided, or that states need not adhere to one-person, one-vote
principles would be rightly denounced by the public as committing
grave constitutional errors-even if the Court could demonstrate
compellingly that its rulings reflected the original understanding in
every case. The gravamen of the complaint against the Court would
131. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A
Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-20, 27-33
(2003) (describing Marbury as a prudent response to the nation's political context and
discussing the continuing existence of prudential decisionmaking). Naim v. Naim, 350
U.S. 985 (1956), in which the Court refused to decide a challenge to the constitutionality of
a state statute prohibiting interracial marriage, id. at 985, provides one notorious example
of prudential avoidance of a judicial decision likely to provoke resistance. See Fallon,
supra, at 29-30. For another example of prudential decisionmaking driven by political
necessity, see David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 70 (1984) (describing the "political exigencies" that
motivated the Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), as well as the
Court's awareness that "efforts to coerce the states to pay their debts would prove
unenforceable").
132. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 131, at 16-20 (describing Marbury as reflecting
"judicial prudence tinctured with guile" in its recognition that "the Court must sometimes
recede from conflict with the political branches or with aroused public opinion in order to
maintain its prestige and thus its power"); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF
THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL
DEMOCRACY 182-86 (2005) (discussing the political circumstances motivating the Court's
opinion in Marbury).
133. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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be that the Constitution that is the fundamental law of the United
States is not an exclusively originalist Constitution. Rather, it is a
Constitution under which the Court can and sometimes must accept
settled precedents around which strong public reliance interests and
expectations have developed. If the Justices should suddenly
abandon the long-accepted rules of recognition that validate some
nonoriginalist precedents as legally authoritative, they would not be
following the law that it is their duty to uphold, but attempting a
jurisprudential if not a political revolution-the judicial analogue to a
coup d'etat. There is reason to doubt whether the Court could get
away with it.
D. The Critics' Objection Restated-and Re-Answered
Although I have now taken a considerable jurisprudential
excursion, my aim has been to establish a single main point:
originalist protestations notwithstanding, it is simply false that the
idea of "interpretation" of a written Constitution commits
interpreters to deciding cases in accordance with the originally
intended meaning or original public understanding of constitutional
language. Correspondingly, it is simply true that nonoriginalist
precedent sometimes prevails as a matter of law over what would
otherwise be the best interpretation of the written Constitution. The
Constitution necessarily draws its meaning from the interpretive
practice or practices in which it is situated. Within our current
interpretive practices, what is accepted and enjoys the status of law is
not the unglossed original Constitution-as it would be read in light
of the original understanding or its plain language-but a
Constitution capable of being interpreted in light of judicial
precedent.
In response to this claim, originalists might attempt any of three
jurisprudential counterarguments. The first would merely apply a
jurisprudential label to, and supply a historical pedigree for, the
originalist assumption that the framers' and ratifiers' understanding
of constitutional language fixes its meaning irrevocably. According to
the theory of law articulated by John Austin, the "commands" of the
sovereign define the law.135 Invoking this theory, originalists might
say that in the case of the United States Constitution, the framers and
ratifiers are the relevant sovereign whose commands (as originally
135. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832),
reprinted in JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE, at xxv, 13-14 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., 1954).
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understood) therefore establish the Constitution's enduring
meaning.136 As H.L.A. Hart demonstrated, however, the command
theory of law is a bankrupt jurisprudential theory. The commands of
a would-be sovereign can count as law only insofar as they are
accepted as such as a matter of sociological fact.'37
A second jurisprudential counterargument might attempt to
portray the Constitution as a contract among the American people
that must be interpreted in accordance with the objective meaning of
the contract's words at the time of its adoption. 3 8 On this view, past
wayward practices-involving nonoriginalist decisionmaking and
adherence to initially erroneous precedents-could not alter the
terms of a historical meeting of the minds. The difficulty, of course, is
that the Constitution is not and never was a contract. 13 9 Not everyone
agreed, or would have agreed, to be bound by the Constitution at the
time of its ratification. 40 No one alive today has ever been asked to
agree to its unglossed original meaning as part of a fair, uncoerced
bargain. Any claim that the Constitution should be regarded as a
contract is therefore misguided."'
A third jurisprudential response would be more subtle.
Embracing Ronald Dworkin's claim that theories of law are
necessarily "interpretive,1' 42 it would concede that the foundations of
law lie in the social facts of contemporary practice, but it would claim
that originalism offers the "best" account-as measured by criteria of
"fit" and normative attractiveness-of the interpretive approach that
the norms of our current practice require.143  An originalist who
adopted this line of defense would begin by emphasizing that existing
practice has an indisputable originalist strand, with many cases
decided in accordance with the original understanding (or at least
with a majority account of the original understanding). An originalist
who accepted Dworkin's interpretive theory of jurisprudence would
136. See id.; see also Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV.
2054, 2064-65 (1995) (identifying the "command theory of law" as a constitutive principle
of "classical" legal positivism).
137. See HART, supra note 21, at 50-61.
138. See generally HARDIN, supra note 47 (developing and debunking this argument).
139. See id.
140. The originalist Randy Barnett so acknowledges. See Randy Barnett,
Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 123 (2003) ("The Constitution was
not approved by a unanimous vote, nor even by a majority of all persons in the country at
the time.").
141. See Barnett, supra note 140, at 123-25.
142. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 87 (arguing that "[l]aw is an interpretive
concept" and that disagreements among judges are "interpretive" disagreements).
143. See id. at 229-32.
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then need to acknowledge that our current practice also includes
nonoriginalist elements, but would insist that the best interpretation
of our practice would characterize precedents claiming judicial
authority to adhere to nonoriginalist decisions as "mistakes." 1"
Although surely imaginable, this purported "interpretation" of
our existing practice seems to me to fail with respect to both of
Dworkin's criteria of "fit" and normative attractiveness. I shall
briefly discuss normative arguments in favor of originalism, and
indicate why I think those arguments unpersuasive, below.'45 With
respect to fit, my arguments to this point will already have suggested
that too many strands of nonoriginalist decisionmaking are too deeply
entrenched in our existing constitutional practice for any theory that
dismissed them as mere mistakes to qualify as an "interpretation" of
existing practice rather than as a reform proposal.
146
E. Practice Within Practices and the Puzzling Phenomenon of
Metarules
Despite originalism's implicit jurisprudential mistake in failing to
acknowledge that the foundations of law lie in current practices of
acceptance, originalists are right about one important thing, which is
crucial in understanding how our constitutional practice works. Many
originalists shrewdly grasp, at least intuitively, that our existing
practices of constitutional adjudication and argument have multiple
levels. Those practices are, moreover, open and reflexive, permitting
and even inviting arguments about what ought to count as good first-
order constitutional arguments even if they are not, now, widely
credited as such. Exploiting the potential fluidity of current
understandings, at least some originalist claims can be interpreted not
as assertions about what current law requires, but as calls for now-
prevailing rules of recognition to be changed for the future so that
interpretations supported by the original understanding of
constitutional language would always prevail. And, significantly,
originalists' arguments for adopting exclusively originalist rules of
recognition count as ones that deserve to be taken seriously (within
broadly shared tacit understandings) in a way that an argument for
interpreting the Constitution to accord with the teachings of, say,
Plato, Hobbes, or Lenin would not.
144. Cf DWORKIN, supra note 103, at 118-23 (discussing the need for legal theories to
dismiss some past decisions as "mistakes").
145. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
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To frame the point specifically in terms of the legal status of
nonoriginalist precedent, those who argue for a rejection of
constitutional stare decisis advance a reform agenda, but one that can
be supported by colorable (even if mistaken) arguments within the
second-order rules (or shared tacit understandings) of our complex,
multilayered constitutional practices. Second-generation originalist
Randy Barnett seems to recognize as much when he laments that
most judges and Justices are not originalists 47 and when he says
expressly that the goal of originalists should be to "achiev[e] a change
in the law, however gradual."'"
Although I have little personal sympathy for the orginalists'
reform agenda, 49 I shall not pause here to engage in sustained
normative argument. My goals in this Article are analytical, not
prescriptive. Nonetheless, it is important to understand that our
147. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted"
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13-15 (2006) (arguing that Justice Scalia is not an
originalist and citing illustrative examples); Barnett, Super Precedent, supra note 58, at
1247 ("[There are] seven full-time non-originalist Justices and one faint-hearted (and part-
time) originalist Justice.").
148. Barnett, Super Precedent, supra note 58, at 1247.
149. Assuming the burden of expressly normative argument, Barnett argues that
reform is in order because it is only through the adoption of an originalist rule or practice
of recognition that we could get a "legitimate" Constitution, by which he means one that
would deserve adherence. See Barnett, supra note 147, at 16-19. In my view, we do have
a Constitution that is "legitimate" in the moral sense of deserving adherence, but it is
crucially pertinent that ours is in considerable part an eighteenth-century Constitution, the
moral attractiveness of which depends largely on its adaptability. It would not be a
morally attractive Constitution if it dictated, for example, that paper money was unlawful
and therefore worthless, that Social Security was unconstitutional, and so forth-or even if
it made the constitutional status of such institutions and decisions depend on the uncertain
outcomes of ongoing historical investigations. Among other things, to make constitutional
validity turn entirely on historical research-in a context in which the Constitution is so
hard formally to amend-would create enormous pressure for the Supreme Court to
engage in less than wholly candid analysis in order to guarantee publicly and politically
acceptable outcomes. I can think of no good reason to create strong incentives for the
Justices to cast themselves as historians and then to falsify the historical record. See
generally Shapiro, supra note 117 (asserting a judicial obligation of candid legal analysis);
David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299 (2005)
(arguing in favor of interpretive methodologies that encourage candor).
In arguing that the Constitution's legitimacy requires the originalist assumption
that constitutional meaning is fixed and unchanging, Barnett also maintains that
authorizing the judiciary to distinguish permissible and desirable adaptations from
impermissible and undesirable ones represents an unfair and imprudent allocation of
political power. See Barnett, Super Precedent, supra note 58, at 1247. In responding to
this argument, I do not mean to overstate my claims, for it is not my view that our current
constitutional regime is ideal. I do, however, have a Burkean sense that we are probably
wiser to continue on with the very old Constitution that we now have-which necessitates
adaptive interpretation-than to accept the hazards of attempting to reach agreement on a
better constitution under our current political circumstances.
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constitutional practice includes second-order arguments about what
the rules of recognition ought to be as well as about how the existing
rules apply to particular cases. Especially in light of the openness of
our constitutional practices to second-order arguments, it is also
important, in thinking about the legal status of initially erroneous
precedents, to understand the contingency of the foundations on
which current law necessarily rests. Today it is unthinkable that
paper money could be unconstitutional. But in a possible future
world in which all financial transactions occurred via wireless
networks, a declaration that greenbacks are unconstitutional might
not be impossible. If a future government succeeded in creating a
strong enough system of individual retirement accounts, it is not
unimaginable that at some point a court might knock the last legs
from under the Social Security system by ruling it constitutionally
invalid. And if skin color ever became as socially irrelevant as eye
color, then the judicial validation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act might
come to be seen as a legal mistake explicable only by the pressures to
which the Supreme Court was subject in the 1960s. Changes such as
these might appear only to alter the status of particular precedents as
beyond overruling with the ultimate criteria of legal validity
remaining unchanged. But the relevant contingencies run deeper. In
a world in which originalist decisionmaking upset few deeply settled
expectations, originalism might take root. However stable current
rules of recognition may appear, any sound theory of precedent in
constitutional adjudication must acknowledge the inescapable
possibility of change.
III. DECISIONS TO OVERRULE PRECEDENT AND THE CONCEPT OF
SUPERPRECEDENT
So far I have discussed whether it is legally legitimate in principle
for the Supreme Court ever to base its rulings on precedent in
constitutional cases in which it would otherwise reach different
conclusions. In this Part, I want to discuss the overruling of
precedent.
A. Precedent and Paradox
Beyond issues of constitutional supremacy under Article VI, the
doctrine of precedent might appear to contain a further paradox to
which I have called attention already: the traditional doctrine
maintains both that past, erroneous decisions can bind the Justices,
requiring them to reject what would otherwise be the best
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interpretation of the Constitution, and that prior judicial mistakes are
not binding insofar as the Justices might decide to overrule them.
The question thus arises whether the doctrine of precedent rests on a
contradiction involving the status of precedent as binding law.
Although Michael Paulsen has argued that the answer to this
question is yes, 5 ' I believe that he is mistaken for reasons that once
again emerge from a practice-based, positivist understanding of
constitutional law. The meaning of the Constitution is partly a
reflection of the practice that the Constitution inhabits, and the
practices of the most immediately responsible officials-judges and
especially Justices-call for judges and Justices to exercise judgment
in determining which initially erroneous precedents to uphold. As
the Justices themselves have put it, reliance on precedent is a policy,
not an inflexible rule.1 1' As I would put it, an ultimate rule of
recognition authorizes the Justices to treat otherwise erroneous
precedents either as binding or not on the basis of case-by-case
considerations, some of which are "pragmatic" and "prudential." '152
In stating this conclusion, I need to stress, once again, that the
Justices' powers are broad and important. As Hart emphasized, any
sophisticated legal system needs power-conferring rules authorizing
some institutions or officials to change the law. Within American
constitutional practice, the rules of recognition that structure
Supreme Court decisionmaking are not always sharply distinguishable
from power-conferring rules authorizing the Court to effect legal
change. Sometimes the Justices appeal to the Constitution's original
meaning or to its plain language to reverse precedents that they
regard as erroneous.'53 But sometimes, too, the Court overrules past
decisions that could plausibly appear consistent with the
Constitution's plain language or original understanding in order to
reach results more consonant with the Court's own precedents.
Lawrence v. Texas,'54 in which the Court reversed an earlier decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick'55 and held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment confers a right on consenting adults to
engage in private acts of sodomy,'56 falls within the latter category.
150. See Paulsen, supra note 4, at 291.
151. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996).
152. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
153. See Calabresi, supra note 126, at 637.
154. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
155. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
156. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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In effecting legal change through constitutional adjudication, the
Supreme Court remains subject to rules (in the Wittgensteinian
sense) 57 that limit its lawful powers, including rules that require it to
pay heed to entrenched expectations and public acceptability. To
repeat now familiar examples, the Court would be wrong to invalidate
Social Security or paper money because of the settled expectations
that have developed around them. By contrast, among the
considerations that made the overruling of Lochner-era precedents
permissible was that by the late 1930s they had become unacceptable
to reigning political majorities.'58 Again, however, any honest,
practice-based account of the authority of the Supreme Court either
to follow or overrule initially erroneous precedent must acknowledge
the large scope accorded to the Justices' practical judgment-another
conclusion that is consistent with the findings of attitudinalist political
scientists'59 and that some normative theorists will think disturbing. I
also believe that any good practice-based account should reflect or at
least be consistent with the insights of game theorists who emphasize
that the Court must decide cases in light of the anticipated reactions
of lower courts, Congress, and ultimately the public for its rulings to
prove durable and effective." This latter set of considerations acts as
a constraint on the Justices' capacity to shape the law-within the
boundaries established by applicable legal rules including rules of
recognition-in accordance with their normative preferences.
B. Superprecedents
In saying that some precedents have generated settled
expectations that preclude their being overruled, I am making claims
similar to those asserted by champions of the idea that our
jurisprudence includes "superprecedents." Admittedly, the notion of
superprecedents does not refer to any category of legal analysis that
the Supreme Court has ever formally invoked. As I have emphasized,
157. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
158. In suggesting that overruling was "acceptable," I do not mean to be taking a stand
on whether or to what extent the unacceptability of the prior regime was the principal
driver of the Supreme Court's reversal of course, as suggested, for example, by William
Leuchtenburg, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 142-43, 216-20 (1995), or
whether the rejection of Lochner and its progeny reflected the culmination of gradually
unfolding doctrinal developments that were at least partly independent of surrounding
political currents, see, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:
THE STRUCrURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 45-46,84-105 (1998).
159. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 23, at 1666-68.
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however, the norms of a practice such as constitutional interpretation
need not be formally stated in order to count as rules in the relevant
sense. If explications of the concept of superprecedent cogently
summarize the tacit norms of existing practice, then the term might be
a useful one.
To date, the concept of superprecedents has most frequently
been deployed, and indeed appears to have originated, in discussions
of whether Roe v. Wade should be viewed as immune from overruling
on the ground that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed it against
multiple challenges over more than three decades. 161 As applied to
continuingly controverted decisions such as Roe, however, the label of
superprecedent seems inapt.1 62
If I understand the tacit norms of our constitutional practice
correctly, for judicial decisions to qualify as superprecedents, they
would need to satisfy at least two criteria. First, and most important,
they would need to have established a rule of law around which
strongly held, settled expectations or reliance interests have
developed. These expectations and interests would need to be
sufficiently strong that the Supreme Court's abandonment of its prior
holding would cause widespread dislocation and predictable,
potentially successful, political efforts to rebuke the Court and to
undo its overruling decision.
A necessary second criterion of a superprecedent, in my view,
would be that it deals with matters that no longer occasion broad,
ongoing, unstable contestation in American law and politics. To be
sure, a bare five to four majority of the Justices said otherwise in
Casey, which gave as a reason for not overruling Roe that for it to do
so "under fire" would put the Court's "legitimacy" at risk.'63 But to
161. The notion of superprecedents first appears to have been articulated in a judicial
opinion by Judge Michael Luttig, who once characterized Roe v. Wade, as having achieved
"super-stare decisis" effect through repeated reaffirmations by the Supreme Court.
Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2000). Senator
Arlen Specter next picked up the term when he asked John Roberts during his Supreme
Court confirmation hearings whether Roberts believed in "super-duper" precedents in
constitutional law. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 1 ("The term superprecedents first surfaced
... when Senator Arlen Specter ... asked [Roberts] whether he agreed that certain cases
like Roe had become superprecedents or 'super-duper' precedents-that is, that they were
so deeply embedded in the fabric of law they should be especially hard to overturn."). For
sympathetic discussions, see generally Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of
Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173 (2006); Gerhardt, supra note 6; and Sinclair, supra note
6.
162. Cf. Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 1222 (observing that "persistent challenges are
indicia of the failure of precedents to achieve super precedent status").
163. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
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accept Casey's dictum as authoritative would be both bold and
imprudent. As the Lochner era illustrates, for the Supreme Court to
fail to renounce a sufficiently reviled decision could itself have
devastating consequences for its perceived legitimacy. It is highly
doubtful that the Casey dictum either stated an enduring normative
commitment of the Justices or expressed a widely shared public
understanding by which a future Court would feel constrained.
Once again, public attitudes are likely to matter in ways that
rational choice theories that emphasize the multitude of games
bearing on constitutional law can help to bring out. If the rules of
constitutional adjudication can be characterized as or are supported
by equilibria, it seems plain that legal equilibria are likely to remain
stable in the long run-not varying with Supreme Court nominations
and confirmations-only insofar as they are acceptable to prevailing
alignments of political forces. Social Security, paper money, and the
1964 Civil Rights Act are now entrenched politically as well as
legislatively. By contrast, Lochner could not remain stable amid the
turmoil of the 1930s that culminated in an enduring political
realignment and led to the reshaping of the Supreme Court.
Although shifts in the political ground since 1973 have not so far
made Roe untenable, the multiple factors needed to support it remain
too fragile for the label of superprecedent to reflect more than wishful
thinking by Roe's supporters.
IV. A SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE: THE ATLITUDINAL MODEL
Although I have now claimed that the tacit norms of
constitutional practice leave a large ambit for Supreme Court Justices
to exercise ideologically influenced judgment, I have also maintained
that precedent matters to their decisionmaking, binding them in some
cases and empowering them in others to extend a precedent's reach. I
have also assumed more generally that the Justices adopt an "internal
point of view"" toward the rules of recognition that lie at the
foundation of our legal system: they regard rules of recognition as
"common standards of official behavior and appraise critically their
own and each other's deviations as lapses." '165 Obviously, the claims
that precedent matters to the Supreme Court and that the Justices
regard the law from an internal point of view both invite challenge.
And prominent among current challenges are those that come, or
might appear to come, from the attitudinal model of Supreme Court
164. HART, supra note 21, at 117.
165. Id.
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decisionmaking, 16 which maintains that the Justices' ideological
values determine their decisions. The best-known proponents of the
attitudinal model, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, assert that
precedent has no significant influence on the Court.'67 In support of
this claim they adduce evidence that Justices who dissent in one case
typically persist in refusing to acknowledge that decision's controlling
authority in future cases. 168
In light of work to date, champions of the attitudinal model seem
almost indubitably right that ideology predicts the Justices' votes with
considerable accuracy and that precedent has less effect on the
Court's decisions than law professors have often assumed.
169
Accordingly, I think it important for law professors to come to grips
with the findings that support the attitudinal model, as I shall attempt
to do at the end of this Part. As I shall explain first, however, the
evidence supporting the attitudinal model furnishes no good reason to
abandon the assumptions that constitutional adjudication is a rule-
based practice and that the Justices characteristically attempt to
conform to rules of recognition. Nor, I shall argue, have attitudinalist
scholars shown that precedent does not matter to the Justices. The
principal adjustment that attitudinalist scholarship should provoke
involves an acknowledgement that Supreme Court Justices, operating
within the rules that define the practice of constitutional adjudication,
are indeed policymakers who are much influenced by their policy
views-but in ways that only a practice-based theory can explain fully.
A. Internal and External Points of View
Following H.L.A. Hart, I have assumed that it is a necessary
condition for the existence of practices of constitutional law and
adjudication that a critical mass of officials, especially Supreme Court
166. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
167. See SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 10, at 287.
168. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 11, at
298-310; SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 10, at 287-315; see also Youngsik Lim, An
Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices' Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721,
739 (2000) ("Regardless of whether or not she was a member of the majority in the
precedent, a justice would strongly tend to follow her decision rather than the precedent
itself.").
169. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 302 (1997) (reviewing
scholarship on judicial motivation); Friedman, supra note 120, at 273-74, ("Virtually all
positive scholars agree with attitudinalists that ideology plays an important role in the
decision of cases .... "); id. at 331 (observing that the challenge to normative theorists is
"to develop an understanding of judicial review that builds upon and incorporates positive
understandings of how judges behave").
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Justices, should accept the practices' constitutive rules and use them
as guides to conduct. In the wake of attitudinalist scholarship,
however, the question arises whether evidence that the Justices
routinely vote in accord with their ideological preferences refutes the
claim that the Justices accept and attempt to adhere to the tacit norms
of adjudication.
The answer is no. As Hart argued in The Concept of Law, legal
norms can be viewed from multiple perspectives. In one application
of Hart's terminology, the "external point of view" is that of an
observer who aims solely to identify regularities that predict future
behavior. 7 ' In this use of the term, assertions made from an external
point of view make no claims about how the subjects of observation
think, only about how they act.17' Another perspective reflects what
Hart called the internal point of view.'72 Although Hart did not use
this term consistently,'73 in the most pertinent sense the internal point
of view is that of someone who "accepts" a practice's constitutive
norms by using them as guides for conduct, criticism, and self-
criticism.1
7 4
Interpreted charitably, the attitudinal model asserts the
paradigmatically external claim that we can best predict the Justices'
decisions if we assume that they will always vote in accordance with
their ideological values. "[O]ur concern is with the votes of the
justices, and thus the behavioral components of attitudes," Segal and
Spaeth write, even as they acknowledge that "attitudes" also "have
cognitive [and] affective ... components."' 75 Or, as Segal and Spaeth
170. See HART, supra note 21, at 89. Hart appears to have used the term sometimes to
refer to the outlook of someone concerned only with predicting behavior and wholly
unconcerned with motivations, see id. at 89-91, and sometimes to refer to the hermeneutic
perspective of a person who grasps the rule applied by an identifiable group but does not
accept or endorse it, see id. at 98-99. For a lucid brief discussion of Hart's varying
conceptions of the external point of view, see generally Shapiro, supra note 28.
171. See HART, supra note 21, at 89-91.
172. See id. at 98; see also id. at 56-57 (noting the "internal aspect" of social rules).
This term implicates notorious complexities. For discussions, see generally Shapiro, supra
note 28; and Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Socio-Legal Methodology for the Internal/External
Distinction: Jurisprudential Implications, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1255 (2006).
173. See Tamanaha, supra note 172, at 1263-65.
174. Hart thus says that to accept a social rule is to treat the rule as a "reason and
justification" for action, HART, supra note 21, at 11, and as a "basis for claims, demands,
admissions, criticism, or punishment," id. at 90. In another usage, an observer adopts an
internal point of view when attempting to grasp the thoughts or outlook of those
participating in a practice. See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1160-61 (referring to this as a
"hermeneutic" point of view and describing it as reflecting Hart's own methodological
approach).
175. SEGAL & SPAETH, ATrITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 11, at 69.
[Vol. 861152
2008] PRECEDENTAND POSITIVIST JURISPRUDENCE 1153
state elsewhere, their stance is one of "agnosticism" on whether
Justices have any "self-awareness" of the influence of their
ideological preferences on their votes; their sole concern, they say, is
with whether "the justices' ideology directly influences their
decisions." '176 Passages in which Segal and Spaeth praise the
attitudinal model for yielding testable predictions also support the
conclusion that it only identifies behavioral regularities, not the
Justices' perceptions of or attitudes toward legal rules.177
Among the reasons not to interpret the attitudinal model as
making claims about the Justices' cognitive understandings or
psychological commitments is that any such claims would be
untenable. Denials that the Justices adhere to rules of recognition
might take either of two forms. First, attitudinalists might maintain
that there are no rules of recognition or that the Justices fail to accept
any such rules as giving them reasons for action, grounds for criticism
of others, and so forth. But this position is almost self-evidently
unsustainable.'78 It is, for example, nearly impossible to imagine a
Justice who did not accept that she was one of a limited number of
people who were as entitled as she to exercise the role of a Justice;
that eight others, in common with herself, occupied that rule-defined
station in virtue of applicable rules of recognition; that a decision
supported by five Justices counts as a decision of the Court, whereas a
decision supported only by a minority of the Justices does not; that
certain other people are members of Congress possessing authorities
unique to that office; that acts voted by Congress and signed by the
President count as law whereas directives voted by other groups do
not; and so on.'79
176. SEGAL & SPAETH, ATrITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 11, at 433.
177. See, e.g., SEGAL& SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 11, at xv-xviii, 32.
178. Cf Rawls, supra note 36, at 26 ("To engage in a practice, to perform those actions
specified by a practice, means to follow the appropriate rules. If one wants to do an action
which a certain practice specifies then there is no way to do it except to follow the rules
which define it."); W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1485 (2006) ("[T]he possibility of a judge regarding the rule of
recognition as non-obligatory is incoherent, in the same way that it would be impossible to
imagine an actual basketball player who did not accept that the rule prohibiting double
dribbling imposed valid obligations on him.").
179. Segal and Spaeth so acknowledge:
[W]e have regularly noted that the justices are not completely free agents. Their
jurisdiction is limited; ... a plurality may not render an opinion of the Court; four
Justices may not overrule five; authoritative decisions should be accompanied by
an opinion that is larded with citation to previously decided cases.... But these
limitations overwhelmingly pertain to the rules of the judicial game, not to its
outcome.
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Alternatively, attitudinalists might claim that although the
Justices of the Supreme Court accept pertinent rules of recognition in
a weak sense, they are always, or almost always, prepared to cheat
whenever they can advance their ideological interests by doing so. °80
The problem with this account, as applied to ultimate rules of
recognition that include rules of constitutional interpretation, is that
such rules can exist only insofar as they are accepted as a matter of
social fact. 81 To say that all of the Justices cheat in their application
of the rules of recognition all or nearly all of the time is thus to say
that there really are not any rules of recognition at all. Again,
however, this claim seems transparently false. Justices are recognized
as Justices, Congress and the President are acknowledged to
possessive distinctive powers, and so forth-all in conformity with
rules of recognition. If the Justices invariably cheat, the invariant
cheating would need to be confined just to some rules of recognition.
It is perfectly coherent to say that some or even all of the Justices
cheat some of the time. It is not coherent to say that all of the
Justices ignore ultimate rules of recognition virtually all of the time.
This analysis confirms my judgment that a different conclusion
should be drawn from Segal and Spaeth's empirical observations: as I
have suggested, the ultimate rules of recognition that are recurrently
tested in disputed Supreme Court cases are sufficiently vague,
indeterminate, or open-textured so that the Justices relatively seldom
understand themselves as constrained from deciding in accordance
with their ideological predilections.1 82 In contrast with the other
possibilities that I have canvassed, this one seems wholly imaginable.
Indeed, it draws significant support from the not infrequent
phenomenon of unanimous Supreme Court opinions.'83 Unanimous
opinions provide strong evidence that Justices of otherwise diverse
SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 11, at 360.
180. See Quinn, supra note 17, at 78-80 (arguing that definitions of practices as rule-
governed behavior must acknowledge the possibility of cheating).
181. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
182. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing
the Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 89, 110 (2005) (observing that the Justices' political preferences are likely to
correspond to, rather than provoke a departure from, the Justices' "best interpretive
judgments"); Tamanaha, supra note 172, at 1272 (explaining that correlations of judicial
decisions with a Justice's ideology do not establish that a judge is not "rule-bound in the
only sense that this can be humanly achieved").
183. From the 1994 Term through the 2003 Term, 35.5% of the Supreme Court's
decisions were by unanimous vote. See Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical
Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 520 tbl.IV (2004) (charting statistics on "Unanimity
and Dissent").
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ideological outlooks acknowledge an obligation to follow applicable
rules when such rules clearly apply. For better or worse, however, not
all cases come within clearly applicable rules-as is suggested by the
fact that the Court's docket consists largely of cases that have divided
the lower courts." To establish that the Justices' ideology tends to
predict their votes in contestable cases by no means proves that
pertinent rules of recognition would not yield clear outcomes, which
the Justices would accept, in most or all of the "easy" cases that never
come before them, or indeed never come before any court at all.185
B. Does Precedent Matter?
As I have said, Segal and Spaeth seem to establish quite
conclusively that precedent matters less in constitutional cases in the
Supreme Court than many, probably most, law professors have
assumed. But their findings do not prove, or even suggest, that
precedent is unimportant. One can accept Segal and Spaeth's
findings that the Justices tend to vote consistently with their political
ideologies and that they rarely accept the authority of precedents
from which they dissented and yet continue to believe that precedent
influences Supreme Court decisionmaking in other ways.
First, the leading studies supporting the attitudinal model fail to
measure what might be called a precedent's "indirect" effect. As I
have argued, the anticipated public unacceptability of an overruling
decision that would upset reliance interests and entrenched
expectations can act as a significant constraint even on the Supreme
Court. In some cases, moreover, the relevant expectations will have
developed partly as a result of a prior judicial ruling. For example,
reliance interests today surround paper money, Social Security, and
the 1964 Civil Rights Act largely because past Court decisions
encouraged reliance to occur. By generating public expectations, at
184. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING To DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 245-52 (1991) (noting that the Supreme Court often grants
certiorari to resolve questions that have divided lower courts).
185. See Cross, supra note 169, at 285-90 (collecting evidence tending to support the
proposition that there is a large category of easy cases in which judges strongly tend to
concur in their analysis); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent,
7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 913 (2005) (noting the political scientists who emphasize the
role of ideology in judicial decisionmaking erroneously "discount the fact that the
Supreme Court's docket consists of hard cases"). Segal and Spaeth so acknowledge. See
SEGAL & SPAETH, ATrITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 11, at 93.
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least some Supreme Court decisions thus constrain the Court from
overruling them.
18 6
Second, notwithstanding the evidence amassed by Segal and
Spaeth, I think it entirely reasonable to surmise, as Lee Epstein and
Jack Knight have argued, that the Justices feel constrained from
overturning too many past decisions-however loose the notion of
"too many" might be-by an apprehension that the public would find
too much instability in constitutional law to be unacceptable.8 7
Third, and most important, precedent achieves deeply
consequential effects by anchoring judicial reasoning in a way that
separates it from purely political reasoning and thereby limits the
Justices' flexibility relative to other public officials.188 The job of
Supreme Court Justices is not merely to vote on who wins disputed
cases, but also to write reasoned opinions that can act as guides to
conduct for lower court judges, other public officials, and private
citizens. In other words, any case that the Court decides will be a
precedent, binding on the lower courts,189 and the Supreme Court is
constrained by the need to create only such precedents-as defined
partly by the reasoning of its opinions-as will have acceptable future
consequences.Y9
An example of how the Justices are constrained by a felt
responsibility to leave the overall body of precedent in a rationally
comprehensible and practically acceptable state emerges from
Commerce Clause doctrine. Since the New Deal, leading cases have
186. See Knight & Epstein, supra note 121, at 1021-22 (noting the need for courts to
follow stare decisis in order to respect established public expectations). Cases challenging
precedents such as those upholding paper money, Social Security, and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act will of course tend not to come before the Supreme Court, because the Justices
would not agree to admit them to their docket. Accordingly, these precedents lie beyond
the formal reach of Segal and Spaeth's claims, which cover only the votes of the Justices in
cases decided on the merits. Sometimes, however, attitudinalists seem to imply more, as,
for example, when Segal and Spaeth stress the absence of enforceable constraints against
the Justices due to their life tenure and say that the Justices are freer than members of
Congress simply to vote their personal policy preferences. See SEGAL & SPAETH,
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 11, at 298-99.
187. See Knight & Epstein, supra note 121, at 1021-22.
188. The Justices not only make precedent the predominant mode of justification in
their opinions, but they also rely heavily on precedent in trying to persuade one another at
conferences. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 15, at 165-67 (1998).
189. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L.
REV. 517, 526 (2006) ("A number of political scientists have ... found that Supreme Court
doctrine does appear to drive subsequent lower court opinions.").
190. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 589 ("If the future must treat what we do now as
presumptively binding, then our current decision must judge not only what is best for now,
but also how the current decision will affect the decision of other... cases.").
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recognized congressional authority to regulate any activity with
substantial, even if only indirect, effects on interstate commerce. 9'
Obviously resisting the idea that congressional power might be wholly
unlimited, a five-Justice majority invalidated federal statutes as
beyond Congress's authority in United States v. Lopez"g and United
States v. Morrison.193 Revealingly, however, Lopez and Morrison
overruled no previous cases, not even the New Deal decisions that
had laid the foundation for pre-Lopez speculations that congressional
power was wholly unbounded. For the Court to have pressed
substantially further would have raised doubts about the
constitutionality of legislation now so thoroughly accepted in
American law and life that its overruling would have provoked a
firestorm of protest and calls to reconstitute the Court at the very
least. Statutes whose constitutional validity would have been thrown
into doubt would have included the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which the
Supreme Court had upheld as a valid exercise of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. 194 Within the shared norms of the
current governing consensus, it is almost unthinkable that the 1964
Civil Rights Act might be unconstitutional-and a Court that must
acknowledge Congress's power to enact that statute has relatively
little room for maneuver in overruling decisions establishing the
broad regulatory authority that Congress invoked when it passed that
landmark legislation.
Once again, I do not mean to put my point too strongly.
Accepted techniques of legal reasoning undoubtedly afford the
Justices significant latitude in distinguishing, and thus avoiding the
need either to overrule or to be bound by, past decisions. Indeed,
evidence accumulates that distinguishing cases, rather than overruling
them, may emerge as a hallmark of the Roberts Court. Chief Justice
Roberts has called for the Court to make decisions on narrow
191. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court,
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 138-43 (2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection
By Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J.
441, 447-49 (2000).
192. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752
(1995) (characterizing the Court's decision in Lopez as "revolutionary").
193. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
194. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (holding that Congress acted
within its power to protect commerce in extending Title II protection to restaurants);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (holding that the
1964 Civil Rights Act is a valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause as applied
to public travel accommodations).
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grounds whenever possible,t95 and a decision distinguishing a prior
case is almost inherently narrower than a decision to overrule the
precedent altogether. Recent cases in which the Court distinguished
prior decisions involving abortion,196  standing to challenge
government support for religion,'97 and the constitutionality of
campaign finance regulation 198 all reveal the possibility of exceedingly
fine distinctions-distinctions so fine that even concurring Justices
have doubted their tenability.'99 Nevertheless, the Court's capacity to
distinguish cases is not boundless. As I have argued, Justices of the
Supreme Court, in particular, manifestly accept an obligation to write
opinions that furnish intelligible guidance to lower courts,
government officials, and the public at large. 00 As is true with nearly
every point that I have made, rational choice models of judicial
behavior reinforce this conclusion: as my colleague Matthew
Stephenson has written, Justices who care about policy will want to
write clear opinions giving coherent guidance to the lower courts as a
means of maximizing their influence over lower court decisions.2 0' In
doing so, the Justices will be constrained by precedent.
C. The Supreme Court as a Policymaking Institution
Long before the development of the attitudinal model, legal
realists debunked the notion that constitutional adjudication was a
mechanical process.2 "2 Other predecessors of the attitudinal model in
the critical legal studies movement pushed the realist claim one step
further by insisting that judicial decisionmaking was political to the
195. See Bill Barnhart, Roberts Strives for Consensus on Court, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2,
2007, at 1.
196. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S .... 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2007)
(distinguishing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)).
197. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S .... 127 S. Ct. 2553,
2571-72 (2007) (distinguishing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
198. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S -, -, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2007)
(distinguishing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
199. See, e.g., Hein, 551 U.S. at - ,127 S. Ct. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing
the majority's "creation of utterly meaningless distinctions which separate the case at hand
from the precedents that have come out differently, but which cannot possibly be (in any
sane world) the reason it comes out differently").
200. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
201. See de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 27, at 764. Eric Rasmusen similarly
argues that self-interested judges may follow existing precedent "in the hope that the new
law they create interstitially will be obeyed by future judges." Rasmusen, supra note 26, at
81 (creating a model to assess how judges who desire influence will behave with regard to
following precedent).
202. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds.,
1993) (presenting the central themes of legal realism).
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core.203 Nevertheless, Segal and Spaeth's data-based demonstration
of the correlation between the Justices' ideological values and their
votes makes it more undeniable than ever before that the Court, in
their phrase, is a "policy maker. '' 21 In my view, the challenge is to
give an account of the senses in which the Court is a policymaker that,
equally importantly, acknowledges the ways in which judicial
policymaking differs from that of executive officials and legislatures.
Too casual references to "policy making" can easily prove misleading.
Unlike Congress, state legislatures, and executive officials, the
Supreme Court can act only by deciding cases. In addition, under
well-established rules (in the Wittgensteinian sense),2 5 the Justices
have little capacity to establish affirmative mandates. They cannot
declare wars, set income tax rates, cut the budget, or establish
welfare, education, or environmental programs. For the most part,
the Court can only articulate constitutional norms to which other
officials must then adhere in pursuing their chosen ends (though the
Justices can, to be sure, hold that some ends are constitutionally
forbidden). If the Court gets to make policy, it is thus mostly
interstitial policy.
More generally, the Court can make policy only by linking its
judgments to accounts of the meaning of the Constitution or laws of
the United States that other officials and the public will accept.
Furthermore, the Court can lawfully do so only insofar as is permitted
by rules of constitutional practice that cabin, even if they do not
always determine, its final decisions.
To put the same points slightly differently, the agenda of the
Supreme Court is vastly different, and necessarily so, from the agenda
of Congress, even if both agendas are in some sense policy agendas.2 °6
The issues are different. The applicable criteria of wise and unwise,
lawful and unlawful decisionmaking also diverge radically.
Nonetheless, one should not protest too much against the claim
that the Supreme Court establishes national policy. In determining
when to overrule or to follow initially erroneous precedents, in
particular, the Court has proclaimed that it takes pragmatic criteria
203. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 191-92 (1988) (discussing possible political motives behind legal
doctrine).
204. See SEGAL& SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 11, at 1-27.
205. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
206. See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Foreword: The Court's
Agenda-and the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-12 (2006).
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into account. 7 And Segal and Spaeth's findings highlight that the
Justices routinely exploit reasonable disagreement about the
implications of existing rules as they attempt to push the law in
directions that accord with their ideological outlooks (subject to rule-
based constraints).2 8 Against the suggestion that the Justices are
legally empowered but also constrained policymakers, a variety of
objections might be raised. I shall briefly discuss just two.
First, for decades Ronald Dworkin has eloquently insisted that
the essence of the judicial role is interpretation.2°9 Justices, in his
view, must decide which interpretation of legal materials puts them in
the best "moral" light,21 0 and in making this judgment their
ideological beliefs necessarily come into play.21I But in assessing what
is best, Dworkin says, judges must-in order to be true to their
institutional roles-limit themselves to rendering judgments of
"principle," or backward-looking assessments of fairness, and must
eschew policy, or forward-looking calculations of social advantage.212
In my view, a fair-minded, nonidealized examination of
constitutional practice will not sustain Dworkin's picture. By their
own account, the Justices take policy into account in determining
whether to overrule established precedents. 213 As scholars as diverse
as Larry Sager and Henry Monaghan have shown, the Supreme Court
sometimes employs doctrinal tests that either underenforce or
overenforce constitutional norms, with the Court making its choices
largely on instrumental grounds.21 4 More generally, the Justices
207. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)
("[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a
series of prudential and pragmatic considerations .... ").
208. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 69.
210. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 2 (1996); see also DWORKIN, supra note
42, at 255 ("Judges who accept the interpretive ideal of integrity decide hard cases by
trying to find ... the best constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal
doctrine of their community.").
211. See DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 254-58.
212. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 69 (1985) ("T]he Court
should make decisions of principle rather than policy...."); DWORKIN, supra note 103, at
82-84 (distinguishing principles from policies and contending that judicial decisions should
be based on the former, not the latter).
213. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
214. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-30 (1975) (discussing rules of
constitutional common law that confer prophylactic protections); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1212, 1212-28 (1978) (discussing underenforcement). See generally Mitchell N.
Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (categorizing decision
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frequently weigh social costs and benefits in determining which
doctrinal formulae, rules, or tests to use to implement vague
constitutional values such as those underlying the Constitution's
guarantees of freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and the
equal protection of the laws.215 If Dworkin meant only to maintain
that the Justices do not make policy in the same way or the same
sense as Congress, he would be right, but his broader claim that policy
is not a proper judicial concern at all goes untenably far.
Another objection to the portrayal of Supreme Court Justices as
policymakers would insist that the Justices do not consciously weigh
competing considerations of cost and benefit, but instead simply see
or experience certain interpretations of texts as indubitably correct.216
According to this view, there is admittedly a multiplicity of
interpretive communities, each defined by its way of seeing or
interpreting, but those with divergent views engage in no instrumental
calculation.2"7 Although this account of interpretation illuminates
conflicting judgments with respect to many matters, constitutional
adjudication in the Supreme Court appears to me to involve a good
deal of self-conscious calculation of relative costs and benefits.218
Such calculation seems all but inevitable after intuitive and
unreflective "understanding" has been shattered-if it ever existed at
all-and the Justices must struggle and occasionally bargain with one
another concerning how to go in contestable terrain.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to make sense of the role of
precedent in constitutional adjudication by emphasizing the extent to
which law is a rule-governed practice that is both made possible and
constituted by rules of recognition that are rooted in social facts of
contemporary acceptance. The notion that the foundations of
rules that over and underenforce the Constitution as part of a taxonomy of constitutional
doctrine).
215. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 26-44 (2001)
(discussing the Court's role not only to interpret, but also implement, the Constitution);
see also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 33-37 (1988)
(describing the role of policy analysis in common law adjudication).
216. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 386-87 (1989) ("To
think within a practice is to have one's very perception and sense of possible and
appropriate action issue 'naturally' . ... Someone who looks with practice-informed eyes
sees a field already organized in terms of perspicuous obligations, self-evidently
authorized procedures, and obviously relevant pieces of evidence.").
217. See id. at 141-42.
218. See FALLON, supra note 215, at 5-8, 28-34 (discussing factors the Court has
considered when interpreting the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
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constitutional law lie in contingent social facts will not prove
congenial to everyone. Among other things, a practice-based
jurisprudential theory implies that constitutional law does not rest on
deductive foundations immovably fixed by historic acts of
lawmaking.219 To understand our constitutional practice, we must
accord particular attention to the rules of recognition presently
accepted and applied by judges and especially Supreme Court
Justices, but we must do so with awareness that their practices are
situated within broader patterns of official acceptance and public
acquiescence to which the Court is predictably and perhaps
necessarily sensitive.
Although the main line of my analysis of precedent-based
constitutional decisionmaking has employed concepts drawn from
jurisprudential literature, I have also emphasized that rational choice
theories that characterize social phenomena in terms of games and
equilibria provide an alternative, sometimes illuminating conceptual
apparatus with which to understand our constitutional practice. The
immanent rules of constitutional practice can be thought of as
equilibria that nearly all parties in a social-ordering game have good
reasons to observe. But the pertinent rules or equilibria may
sometimes structure and bound the processes by which judges and
Justices develop and seek to persuade others to adopt their positions
without determining uniquely correct answers to constitutional
questions. In the absence of a more determinate network of rules or
equilibria than now exists, the practice of constitutional adjudication
is relatively open to argument and change, especially in the kinds of
cases that come before the Supreme Court.
When the role of constitutional precedent is examined from a
practice-based perspective, helpful light begins to pour down upon a
number of controverted issues. First, it becomes clear that initially
erroneous Supreme Court decisions can possess the status of binding
law because the rules of recognition currently applied by the Justices
and others entitle some such decisions to be so treated.
Second, existing rules of recognition confer on Supreme Court
Justices a power, to be exercised in accord with legal standards, to
determine which initially erroneous precedents to enforce and which
to overrule. This is a large and important power, reflective of the
Supreme Court's vast authority, that originalists resent but that our
current law countenances. Yet the Court's power, though broad, is
219. See Fallon, supra note 121, at 1852-53 (explaining the contingent foundation of
constitutional law and practice).
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not unlimited. Once again, the Court is hemmed in by rules-in what
I have characterized as the Wittgensteinian sense of that term-that
limit its authority. The term "superprecedent" calls attention,
however inelegantly, to the Court's obligation to adhere to
precedents that support broadly shared and deeply entrenched
interests. For example, a Supreme Court that held Social Security or
paper money or the 1964 Civil Rights Act to be unconstitutional
would act lawlessly and would be held to account for doing so, even if
it could demonstrate irrefutably that its conclusion correctly reflected
the original understanding of constitutional language. By contrast,
Roe v. Wade can be legally secure in the long run only insofar as the
political forces that drive Supreme Court nominations and
confirmations support or accept it. The Court's practice of
constitutional adjudication exists among related practices of legal and
political debate, and the boundaries that separate legal from other
social norms are often permeable.
Third, although the proponents of an attitudinal model of
Supreme Court decisionmaking are right about some things, a
practice-based account of constitutional law reveals ways in which
precedent matters to the Justices that attitudinalists have largely
overlooked. Among other avenues of influence, precedent constrains
the Court by fostering entrenched expectations and reliance interests
that the Court must thereafter respect. Perhaps even more
important, precedent constrains the Court because the constitutive
norms of constitutional practice require the Justices not only to vote
for results in particular cases, but also to explain how current
decisions fit together with past rulings to form a coherent pattern. As
game theory suggests, a Court that failed to take precedent seriously
in crafting its opinions-and also at the stage of determining which
opinions to write-would severely diminish its capacity to guide
future decisionmaking by the lower courts. In the ordinary run of
Supreme Court cases, precedent may not matter as much as, or in
precisely the ways that, law professors have tended to assume. But it
matters deeply, nonetheless, in a practice of constitutional
adjudication by the Supreme Court that is nested within, but also is
distinct from, other practices of law and politics.
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